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RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE CONDITION DISCLOSURE
LEGISLATION
Robert M. Washburn*
INTRODUCTION
In July of 1985 the California legislature enacted the first statute
requiring sellers of residential real property, and participating bro-
kers, to disclose to prospective purchasers comprehensive informa-
tion relative to the condition, value and desirability of the property
offered for sale.1 Within a few years thereafter, sixteen other states
passed legislation mandating a more limited form of disclosure by
sellers, but not by brokers.2 Presently, many of the remaining thirty-
three states appear to be considering the more limited, prevailing
form of mandatory property condition disclosure legislation. 3
The California legislation essentially codified the state's unique
common law requirement that both sellers and brokers discover and
disclose all information material to the value and desirability of the
property offered for sale.4 Where it has been enacted, however, the
prevailing form of limited disclosure legislation has frozen the local
common law at a stage of development primitive by California stan-
dards. 5 The desirability of this movement toward enacting property
condition disclosure legislation can be most usefully evaluated only
after a comparative analysis of the common law, the various legisla-
tive regulatory schemes, and the effects of the latter on the evolution
of the former.
Part I of this Article examines the common law development of
inspection and disclosure duties on sellers, brokers, and buyers in
* Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law (Camden). A.B., Rutgers University, 1966; J.D.,
Washington University, 1968; LL.M., University of Pennsylvania, 1971. I am grateful for the
assistance of Professor Barbara A. Ash. I wish to thank Charles B. Castillo, Rutgers Law School,
class of 1996, and Jeanne M. King, Rutgers Law School, clasg of 1995, for research assistance.
1. S.B. 453, ch. 223, § 4 (1985) (codified at CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1102-1102.15, 2079-2079.10
(West 1994); see infra notes 190-236 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 237-344 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 345-46 and accompanying text.
4. Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
5. See infra notes 400-03 and accompanying text.
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the residential real estate sales market.6 It concludes that the com-
mon law has been developing in a salutary fashion to impose greater
duties of fairness and commercial reasonableness on sellers and
brokers.7
Part II discusses developments in the seventeen states that have
imposed an explicit duty of inspection or disclosure on seller or bro-
kers. 8 These requirements have been enacted by statute in most
states, and by the real estate brokerage regulatory agency in a few
others.9 Part II then describes the various regulatory schemes in de-
tail and compares the approaches of the various states. 10
Part III synthesizes the development of the common law inspec-
tion and disclosure requirements with the recent statutory/regula-
tory enactments. It concludes that the growth of legislation in this
area has arrested the development of the common law.11 This is true
because these statutes and regulations generally do not require as
6. See infra notes 17-181 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 40-166 and accompanying text.
8. There are several related statutory disclosure developments that are not discussed in this
Article. First are statutes and regulations that require real estate brokers to disclose to the buyer
that they represent the seller in the transaction, known as agency disclosure laws. See, e.g., S.H.A.
225 ILCS 455/18.2 (1992); see generally ARTHUR R. GAUDIO, REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE LAW
344-46 (1987 & Supp. 1994) (claiming that a broker's failure to disclose his conflict of interest to
the buyer is a breach of statutorily imposed duties); James A. Bryant & Donald R. Epley, The
Conditions and Perils of Agency, Dual Agency, and Undisclosed Agency, 21 REAL EST. L.J. 117
(1992) (discussing the broker's obligations and duties to a buyer and seller in real estate transac-
tions). Second, a number of states have enacted laws requiring environmental disclosure and
remediation of contaminated sites prior to sale. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25359.7 (West Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-134a-d, 22a-452a (West 1990);
N.J. STAT. ANN. 13:IK-6 (West 1994); see generally Anne Andrew & Elizabeth L. DuSold,
Seller Beware: The Indiana Responsible Property Transfer Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 761 (1991)
(discussing the disclosure requirements of the Indiana Responsible Property Transfer Law which
contains these provisions); Judith G. Tracy, Beyond Caveat Emptor: Disclosure to Buyers of Con-
taminated Land, 10 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 169 (1991) (discussing the federal and state requirements
of disclosure to buyers of contaminated land, and proposing the legislation should impose an af-
firmative duty on the seller to inform the buyer about contaminated land). Third, several states
have enacted legislation shielding sellers and brokers from a failure to disclose psychological or
prejudicial factors ("stigma statutes"). See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-1-16 (Supp. 1992); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 40-57-270 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); see generally Marianne M. Jennings, Buying
Property From the Addams Family, 22 REAL EST. L.J. 43, 51-53 & n.78 (1993) (listing the
passage of shield laws in eighteen states); Sharlene A. McEvoy, Caveat Emptor Redux: "Psycho-
logically Impacted" Property Statutes, 18 W. ST. U. L. REV. 579 (1991) (arguing that statutes
shielding sellers and brokers from liability for nondisclosure of murder, suicide, other felonies
occurring on the property, or that a resident suffers from AIDS, is improper, as it withholds
material facts which may influence a purchase decision).
9. See infra notes 181-344 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 181-344 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 347-79 and accompanying text.
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much disclosure as the common law required, and because most of
the legislative disclosure burden is placed on the seller rather than
on the real estate broker.12 The National Association of Realtors
(NAR) has been active in promoting the enactment of the prevail-
ing (non-California) form of legislation. s Clearly, the NAR is at-
tempting to protect its membership from the common law develop-
ment of broker inspection/disclosure duties by promoting legislation
which places more of the burden on the seller.'
Part IV discusses the practical ramifications of the prevailing dis-
closure requirements on purchasers, sellers, and brokers. It suggests
that purchasers might best be protected by the prevailing common
law trend. 15 Finally, to the extent that additional states might con-
sider adopting legislation in this area, Part V discusses a number of
practical considerations which have thus far been ignored in the ex-
tant statutory enactments. 6
I. JUDICIALLY-CREATED DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS
The rights to buy, own, and sell property are inherent and much
protected individual rights under the common law of the United
States. Among other things, this notion is reflected in the applicable
provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion.' 7 Consistent with that view of property rights, the sale of resi-
dential real property by its owner was not burdened with the imposi-
tion of affirmative disclosure duties by the traditional common
law. 18 Historically, the duty to obtain the information necessary to
evaluate the value of property offered for sale was allocated to the
buyer rather than the seller or his agents.' 9
As Lord Cairns articulated in 1873, "mere nondisclosure of mate-
rial facts, however, morally censurable..., would in my opinion
12. See infra notes 347-79 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 400 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 400-03 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 379-403 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 404-81 and accompanying text.
17. U.S. CoNsT. amends. V, XIV.
18. Robert M. Zeit, Comment, Real Estate - Broker Liability to Purchasers - Herbert v.
Saffell, 877 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1989), 63 TEMP. L. REv. 165, 165 (1990) (stating that tradition-
ally, buyer recovery was barred by the doctrine of caveat emptor which denied the existence of a
fiduciary relationship between the buyer and seller).
19. Id. (noting that the doctrine of caveat emptor denies that seller or his agent has an affirma-
tive duty to inspect or disclose defects in property).
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form no ground for an action in the nature of misrepresentation." 20
This traditional allocation of duty to the purchaser came to be
known as the doctrine of caveat emptor, that is, let the buyer be-
ware (or take care).2 1 Though much criticized by those enamored of
a more paternalistic regulation of commercial transactions, the doc-
trine is based on the premise that there is no need to burden a seller
of real property with protecting the buyer.22 Speaking for the
United States Supreme Court in 1970, Justice Davis emphatically
stated:
No principle of the common law has been better established, or more often
affirmed, both in this country and in England than ... the maxim of caveat
emptor. Such a rule, requiring the purchaser to take care of his own inter-
ests, has been found best adapted to the wants of trade in the business trans-
actions of life.28
Accordingly, unlike an individual investor in corporate securities for
example, a prospective purchaser of real property has been thought
not to lack the economic bargaining power or the financial sophisti-
cation to protect herself.24
Closely related to caveat emptor, and also serving to insulate the
seller from liability, is the doctrine of merger. In real estate transac-
tions, the doctrine of merger holds that all warranties and represen-
tations made in connection with a sale, unless specifically given ef-
fect after the passage of title, are considered to be merged into the
deed .2  The deed is considered full performance of the contract of
sale. 6 Once the buyer accepts the deed, the rights between seller
and buyer are regulated by the deed; the contract ceases to exist.27
The merger doctrine satisfies and extinguishes all contact covenants
which relate to title, possession, quantity or emblements of the
land.2 8
20. Peek v. Gurney, L.R. 6 H.L. 377, 403 (1873), quoted in Wilhite v. Mays, 232 S.E.2d 141,
142-43 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976), afd, 235 S.E.2d 532 (Ga. 1977).
21. Kellogg Bridge Co. v. Hamilton, 110 U.S. 108, 116 (1884). For a detailed discussion of the
history and development of caveat emptor, see Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat
Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 1133-86 (1931).
22. Hamilton, supra note 21, at 1133-86.
23. Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. 383, 388 (1870).
24. Hamilton, supra note 21, 1133-86.
25. Andreychak v. Lent, 607 A.2d 1346, 1347 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. (finding a vendor liable for breach of the warranty of habitability under the doctrine of
merger); see also Knight v. Breckheimer, 489 A.2d 1066, 1068 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985) (prohibit-
ing buyers from recovery due to the doctrine of merger). But see Deerhurst Estates v. Meadow
384 [Vol. 44:381
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Although the early common law refrained from mandating any
disclosure by prospective sellers of real property, it did not leave the
parties to real estate transactions without important and perhaps
generally adequate legal remedies. 9 Justice Davis also noted that
the doctrine of caveat emptor does not shield a seller from liability
in the case of an express warranty, 80 where the buyer has not had an
opportunity to inspect the property,31 or where the seller is guilty of
fraud 2 The usual contract remedies have always been available to
both parties, including remedies for breach of any express warran-
ties."3 More relevant to the issue of regulation by mandatory disclos-
ure are the classic common law tort remedies for damages caused
by intentional misrepresentation,3" negligent misrepresentation," or
fraudulent concealment. 6 These remedies are clearly applicable to
Homes, Inc., 165 A.2d 543, 547-48 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960) (stating that collateral and
independent covenants are exceptions to the doctrine of merger), cert. denied, 167 A.2d 55 (N.J.
1961).
29. Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. 383, 388 (1870).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Traditionally, a purchaser of a used residence had no remedy against a seller under an
implied warranty of habitability theory, a theory generally applicable to builder-vendors in the
sale of new homes. See, e.g., Haygood v. Burl Pounders Realty, Inc., 571 So. 2d 1086, 1087 (Ala.
1990); Bernstein v. Ainsworth, 371 N.W.2d 682, 687-88 (Neb. 1985). For cases involving sales of
new homes by the builder, see Hope v. Brannan, 557 So. 2d 1208, 1210 (Ala. 1990); Stevens v.
Bouchard, 532 A.2d 1028 (Me. 1987); Mobley v. Copeland, 828 S.W.2d 717 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992). A New Jersey Appellate Court, however, has recently broken new ground by allowing a
buyer to recover against the seller of a used home with a defective septic system holding that "an
implied warranty of habitability should also apply to the sale of a used home," based on "current
notions of what is right and just." Andreychak v. Lent, 607 A.2d 1346, 1348 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1992).
34. The elements of intentional misrepresentation are: (1) a false representation of fact; (2)
knowledge by the defendant that the representation is false (or reckless disregard for the truth or
falsity of the statement); (3) intent to induce the plaintiff to rely on the information; (4) justifiable
reliance upon the representation by the plaintiff; and (5) damage to the plaintiff resulting from
the reliance on the representation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1989); W. PAGE
KEETON et al., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 728 (5th ed. 1984); see,
e.g., Stewart v. Thrasher, 610 N.E.2d 799, 803 (I11. App. Ct. 1993) (applying elements of inten-
tional misrepresentation to areas of recent real estate sales).
35. The primary difference between negligent misrepresentation and intentional misrepresenta-
tion is that in a negligent misrepresentation suit the plaintiff does not have to prove that the
defendant made the false representation with the intent to deceive, or that he or she knew the
disclosed information was false. See, e.g., Lyons v. Christ Episcopal Church, 389 N.E.2d 623, 625
(Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (recognizing that an action for negligent misrepresentation is maintainable if
it alleges the elements of a duty owed, a breach of such duty, and an injury resulting from such
breach). The plaintiff may satisfy the element of culpability by proving only a lack of reasonable
care. KEETON. supra note 34, § 107, at 745.
36. Stewart, 610 N.E.2d at 804. In order to prove that the concealment amounted to fraudulent
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real estate sales and other transactions, and they are inherently ca-
pable of evolving to accommodate the changing circumstances of the
relevant marketplace.
Most influential to the concept of mandating disclosure through
legislation has been the very gradual expansion of the scope of ac-
tionable common law fraud to include the nondisclosure of material
information by sellers and brokers. 7 Essentially, courts have in-
creasingly imposed a duty to speak and have found liability for non-
disclosure because, coupled with a duty to speak, a nondisclosure is
the equivalent of a false disclosure.3 8 It must be emphasized that
while courts began to hold that nondisclosures may satisfy the ele-
ments of a false statement of a material fact, the remaining tort
elements of culpability, reasonable reliance, causation, and damage
have remained essential to any recovery based on common law
fraud .
A. Obligations Imposed on the Seller
Under traditional common law, sellers of real property had a duty
to prospective purchasers not to make any false representations or
actively conceal any defects or material facts.40 That traditional
misrepresentation, the plaintiff must prove (1) the concealment of a material fact; (2) the conceal-
ment was intended to induce a false belief under the circumstances creating a duty to speak; (3)
the innocent party could not have discovered the truth through a reasonable inquiry or inspection,
or was prevented from making a reasonable inquiry or inspection, and relied upon the silence as a
representation that the fact did not exist; (4) the concealed information was such that the injured
party would have acted differently had he been aware of it; and (5) that reliance by the person
from whom the fact was concealed led to his injury. Id.
37. See infra note 39 (discussing remedies available to a purchaser for seller's breach of the
implied warranty of habitability for a failure to disclose).
38. See infra note 39 (discussing the elements of fraudulent concealment).
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1989) (defining common law fraud and
outlining the necessary elements); In Lingsch, a California court defined a real estate fraud action
for nondisclosure as consisting of the following five elements:
(1) Nondisclosure by the defendants of facts materially affecting the value or desira-
bility of the property; (2) Defendant's knowledge of such facts and of their being
unknown to or beyond the reach of the plaintiff; (3) Defendant's intention to induce
action by the plaintiff; (4) Inducement of the plaintiff to act by reason of the nondis-
closure; and (5) Resulting damages.
Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 206 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
40. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (discussing the common law tort remedies
for intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment). Ca-
veat emptor does not apply "where the falsity of the defendant's statements is not apparent from
the inspection, where the plaintiff is not competent to judge the facts without an expert or where
the defendant has superior knowledge about the matter in issue." Epperson v. Roloff, 719 P.2d
799, 803 (Nev. 1986).
[Vol. 44:381
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duty did not, however, generally require sellers to affirmatively dis-
close such material facts, and mere silence without a duty to speak
has never been actionable.4 However, courts have increasingly
found that certain circumstances, particularly partial disclosure,
create a duty to speak."2 Therefore, if the seller is asked about or
speaks about a particular subject, he or she must make a full and
fair disclosure as to that subject so as not to mislead the buyer.4
Also rather well established is the obligation of complete disclosure
based on a finding of an agency, fiduciary, confidential, or other re-
lationship of trust existing legally or factually between the parties.44
A majority of state courts have expanded the scope of the duty of
a seller of residential real property to disclose material facts to a
prospective buyer.45 For example, in the often-cited leading case of
Lingsch v. Savage,"" the California Court of Appeals concluded:
[Where it was] presented with an instance of mere nondisclosure, rather
than active concealment occurring between parties not in a confidential rela-
tionship ... [that] it is now well settled in California that where the seller
knows of facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property
which are known or accessible only to him and also knows that such facts
are not known to, or within reach of the diligent attention and observation of
the buyer, the seller is under a duty to disclose them to the buyer. Failure of
41. See Jarvis v. Bellefeuille, No. 577, 1991 WL 253086, at *1 (Mass. App. Div. 1991) (hold-
ing that mere nondisclosure of defects by a vendor of real property is not actionable); see also
Bernard v. Gershman, 559 A.2d 1171, 1173 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that a vendor fraudu-
lently misrepresented the adequacy of the water supply).
42. See infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text (discussing the duty to speak).
43. Burman v. Richmond Homes Ltd., 821 P.2d 913, 919 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that a
seller has a duty to disclose if seller states facts he knows will create a false impression unless
other facts are disclosed); Catucci v. Ouellette, 592 A.2d 962, 963 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991) (claim-
ing that the seller generally has no duty to speak but if he speaks, he must make a full and fair
disclosure as to matters upon which he assumes to speak and must avoid deliberate nondisclo-
sures); Nei v. Burley, 446 N.E.2d 674, 676 (Mass. 1983) (recognizing that the seller has a duty
not to convey half-truths or partial disclosures which would then require full disclosure to avoid
deception).
44. See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lisenby, 579 So. 2d 1291, 1294 (Ala. 1991) (finding no
fiduciary duty between the parties where vendor did not have actual knowledge of defect); Ramel
v. Chasebrook Constr. Co., 135 So. 2d 876, 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (holding land develop-
ers and contractors liable for defects in a foundation, where such defects were not visible or dis-
coverable at the time of sale); Haberman v. Greenspan, 368 N.Y.S.2d 717, 719 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1975) (holding vendor-builder liable for fraudulently concealing massive foundation cracks in
home sold to plaintiffs).
45. See generally Frona M. Powell, Relief for Innocent Misrepresentation: A Retreat From the
Traditional Doctrine of Caveat Emptor, 19 REAL EST. L.J. 130 (1990); Ellen J. Curnes, Note,
Protecting the Virginia Homebuyer: A Duty to Disclose Defects, 73 VA. L. REV. 459, 465-67
(1987). Contra, e.g., Nei, 446 N.E.2d at 676; Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672, 675
(N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
46. 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
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the seller to fulfill such duty of disclosure constitutes actual fraud."'
Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed a ruling of sum-
mary judgment in favor of a seller of real property infested with
roaches, holding that "current principles grounded on justice and
fair dealing, . . . clearly call for a full trial below."4 8 In support of
its decision, the court noted that:
[T]he statement may often be found if either party to a contract of sale
conceals or suppresses a material fact which he is in good faith bound to
disclose then his silence is fraudulent. The attitudes of the courts toward
nondisclosure is undergoing a change and contrary to Lord Cairn's famous
remark, it would seem that the object of the law in these cases should be to
impose on parties to the transaction a duty to speak whenever justice, equity
and fair dealing demand it. This statement is made only with reference to
instances where the party to be charged is an actor in the transaction. This
duty to speak does not result from an implied representation by silence, but
exists because a refusal to speak constitutes unfair conduct. 49
In a third case, which involved property with a defective roof, the
Florida Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's award of rescission
reasoning that:
[M]odern concepts of justice and fair dealing have given our courts the op-
portunity and latitude to change legal precepts in order to conform to soci-
ety's needs. Thus the tendency of the more recent cases has been to restrict
rather than extend the doctrine of caveat emptor. The law appears to be
working toward the ultimate conclusion that full disclosure of all material
facts must be made whenever elementary fair conduct demands it."
As the above examples illustrate, state courts have begun to ex-
pand the duty of a seller to disclose, thereby making a nondisclosure
as actionable as a false disclosure. In other words, the plaintiff must
establish all of the several elements of common law fraud as set
forth above. 1 In either case, the materiality of the nondisclosure is
47. Id. at 204 (emphasis added).
48. Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 317 A.2d 68, 75 (N.J. 1974).
49. Id. at 72 (quoting W. Page Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEx. L.
REV. 1, 31 (1936)).
50. Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 629 (Fla. 1986); see also Hill v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115,
1119 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that nondisclosure may be equated with, and given the same
legal effect as fraud and misrepresentation); Vaught v. Satterfield, 542 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Ark.
1976) (recognizing that in order to sustain alleged fraud in a failure to disclose case, the pur-
chaser must prove that the defect was not observable); Posner v. Davis, 395 N.E.2d 133, 138 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1979) (describing the measure of damages for a fraudulently concealed defect in
property).
51. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (noting the elements of common law fraud in a
real estate action).
[Vol. 44:381
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critical.52 A fact is material as a matter of common law fraud if "a
reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexis-
tence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in ques-
tion."15 3 Specifically in the area of real estate fraud, state courts gen-
erally relied on that classic definition.54 For example, an Alaska
court held that a material fact is one "to which a reasonable man
might be expected to attach importance in making his choice of ac-
tion,"55 and a Florida court held that a material fact is one which
substantially affects the value of the property.
56
Although materiality is a mixed question of law and fact, courts
have found the following conditions to be material so that a seller's
failure to disclose them is actionable: prior termite damage,57 active
termite damage,5 8 illegal and condemned building,5 defective roof,60
defective well,61 radioactive mine tailings,62 filled soil," defective
52. See Harlan v. Smith, 507 So. 2d 943, 946 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) (holding that a fact is
material when it is likely to induce reliance on the part of the injured party); Reed v. King, 193
Cal. Rptr. 130, 131 (Cal. App. 1983) (holding seller liable for failing to disclose the material fact
that the property was the site of a decade-old multiple murder); Delahanty v. First Pa. Bank, 464
A.2d 1243, 1252 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (finding a misrepresentation to be material if it is of such
character that had it been made, the transaction would not have been consummated); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538, 550 (1989) (stating that the element of materiality is essential
in cases of common law fraud for non-disclosure).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1989).
54. See, e.g., Hill, 725 P.2d at 1119 (stating that a reasonable person would not have entered
into a real estate contract if notified of termite damage to the property); Stewart v. Thrasher, 610
N.E.2d 799, 804 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (noting that the other party would have acted differently
had he been aware of the nondisclosed fact); Kaze v. Compton, 283 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Ky. 1955)
(claiming that the plaintiffs would not have purchased the property for the price paid had they
been apprised of the concealed fact); Sevin v. Kelshaw, 611 A.2d 1232, 1237 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992) (stating that if the fact is of such character that had it not been made, the transaction
would not have been consummated); see also infra notes 55-80 and accompanying text (discussing
other examples of this principle).
55. Cousineau v. Walker, 613 P.2d 608, 613 (Alaska 1980) (quoting W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 108, at 719 (4th ed. 1971)).
56. Revitz v. Terrell, 572 So. 2d 996, 998 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
57. Soniat v. Johnson-Rast & Hays, 626 So. 2d 1256, 1259 (Ala. 1993); Hill, 725 P.2d at
1115.
58. Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 317 A.2d 68, 74 (N.J. 1974).
59. Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
60. Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 627 (Fla. 1986).
61. Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757, 763 (Alaska 1982); Copelin v. Corter, 724 S.W.2d 146,
147-48 (Ark. 1987); Bernard v. Gershman, 559 A.2d 1171, 1173-74 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989);
Lockard v. Carson, 287 N.W.2d 871, 872-73, 876 (Iowa 1980). But see Klott v. Associates Real
Estate, 322 N.E.2d 690, 693 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974); Mitchell v. Straith, 698 P.2d 609, 613 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1985).
62. Schnell v. Gustafson, 638 P.2d 850, 852 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981).
63. Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 391 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Cohen v. Vivian, 349
P.2d 366 (Colo. 1960); Loghry v. Capel, 132 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Iowa 1965); Carver v. Roberts,
1995]
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septic system, 4 building code violation,6 5 lot requiring retaining wall
prior to constructing a building, 6 generally deteriorated condition of
the property,67 wood beetle damage,6 8 water rights,6 9 contaminated
well, °7 basement flooding,7 1 drain tile underneath house 7 2 structural
defects,'s artisan well underneath property, prior fire damage, 5
tilting house, 6 sewer connection charges,7  house insulated with
ureaformaldehyde insulation 78  defective earth-sheltered home 7 9
and flood damage. 80
Although this list is extensive, a few courts have found that sellers
have a duty to disclose only where the defect or condition (whether
or not material) is dangerous or poses a threat to health and
safety. 81 In Michigan, for example, where sellers are not liable for
damages caused by defects existing at the time of sale, the courts
acknowledge that they are required to "disclose to the purchaser
any concealed condition known to him which involves an unreasona-
ble danger. Failure to make such disclosure or efforts to conceal a
337 S.E.2d 126, 128 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
64. Catucci v. Ouellette, 592 A.2d 962, 963-64 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991); Wilhite v. Mays, 232
S.E.2d 141, 143 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976); Andreychak v. Lent, 607 A.2d 1346, 1348 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1992); Anderson v. Harper, 622 A.2d 319, 323-24 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 634
A.2d 222 (Pa. 1993).
65. Revitz v. Terrell, 572 So. 2d 996, 997-98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Morris v. Cowart, 411
S.E.2d 81, 83 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991); Scharf v. Tiegerman, 561 N.Y.S.2d 271, 271-72 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1990).
66. Wiederhold v. Smith, 418 S.E.2d 141, 143 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
67. Fincher v. Bergeron, 387 S.E.2d 371, 373 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); Mitchell v. Skubiak, 618
N.E.2d 1013, 1018-19 (I11. App. Ct. 1993); Wagner v. Cutler, 757 P.2d 779, 779 (Mont. 1988);
Holcomb v. Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507, 512 (N.D. 1985).
68. Mulkey v. Waggoner, 338 S.E.2d 755, 756-57 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
69. Russ v. Brown, 529 P.2d 765, 769-70 (Idaho 1974).
70. Janinda v. Lanning, 390 P.2d 826, 829 (Idaho 1964).
71. Munjal v. Baird & Warner, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 855, 863 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Long v. Brown-
stone Real Estate Co., 484 A.2d 126, 128-30 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
72. Kaze v. Compton, 283 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Ky. 1955).
73. Leflore v. Anderson, 537 So. 2d 215, 218 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Thacker v. Tyree, 297
S.E.2d 885, 886 (W. Va. 1982).
74. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wood, 418 N.W.2d 408, 411 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
75. Barylski v. Andrews, 439 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969). But see March v. Dilly
Door Co., 600 N.E.2d 281, 283 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
76. Correa v. Maggiore, 482 A.2d 192, 196 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
77. Foust v. Valleybrook Realty Co., 446 N.E.2d 1122, 1125 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).
78. Roberts v. Estate of Barbagallo, 531 A.2d 1125, 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
79. Silva v. Stevens, 589 A.2d 852, 857-58 (Vt. 1991).
80. Ware v. Scott, 257 S.E.2d 855, 858 (Va. 1979).
81. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (noting the case law from the jurisdictions
which have held that the seller has a duty only when defects prove to be dangerous or threaten
health or safety).
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dangerous condition render the vendor liable for resulting inju-
ries. ' 81 Similarly, a Pennsylvania appeals court, in holding the sell-
ers liable for failing to disclose a defective sewage disposal system,
affirmed that "[t]he modern view ...holds that where there is a
serious and dangerous latent defect known to exist by the seller,
then he must disclose such defect to the unknowing buyer or suffer
liability for his failure to do so."83 Noteworthy in that case is that
the seller may not have known of the dangerous condition, sug-
gesting that in Pennsylvania the element of culpability may be satis-
fied by reckless disregard or negligence, at least where an unsafe
condition exists.84 Another Pennsylvania court also noted that mate-
riality is not required when the "misrepresentation is knowingly
made or involves a non-privileged failure to disclose." 86
As explained above, most courts view a seller's nondisclosure
where there is a duty to speak as the equivalent of an affirmative
misrepresentation." Accordingly, a buyer alleging nondisclosure
must also prove the several other elements of common law fraud. 7
The element of culpability in the area of real estate fraud, as else-
where, has been the subject of considerable attention by the courts,
and has resulted in some expansion of a defrauded purchaser's cause
of action.88 Although traditionally that crucial element could be sat-
isfied only where the misrepresentation or omission was knowingly
made, it can now be satisfied in certain circumstances in some juris-
dictions by recklessness or even negligence. 8'
A limited number of courts have gone so far as to find an inno-
cent misrepresentation actionable. In a case involving defects in ti-
82. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wood, 418 N.W.2d 408, 411 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353 (1977) (discussing liability for undisclosed dangerous
conditions known to the vendor).
83. Anderson v. Harper, 622 A.2d 319, 323 (Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 634 A.2d 222 (Pa.
1993).
84. Id. at 324.
85. Shane v. Hoffmann, 324 A.2d 532, 536 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974).
86. See, e.g., Bernard v. Gershman, 559 A.2d 1171, 1173 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989) (finding
fraudulent misrepresentation where vendor failed to report inadequacy of property's water sup-
ply); see also supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of intentional
misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment).
87. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of common law fraud).
88. For a discussion of a case that expanded the defrauded buyer's cause of action, see infra
text accompanying notes 149-59.
89. See, e.g., Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 394-95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Ander-
son v. Harper, 622 A.2d 319, 323 (Pa. Super. Ct.) appeal denied, 634 A.2d 222 (Pa. 1993). For a
discussion of the Easton case, see infra notes 149-59 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
the Anderson case, see supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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tie, a Pennsylvania court suggested that "if it is determined that a
purchaser in a real estate transaction has suffered from fraud by the
seller, even in the nature of an innocent misrepresentation of a ma-
terial fact, a right of rescission is established. '"10 Other courts have
indicated that a seller of real property may be liable for an innocent
misrepresentation if the buyer justifiably relies on the misrepresen-
tation.9 1 In a case where the transaction depended on the property
being issued a permit for a septic tank, the Washington Court of
Appeals found that:
When a seller, even though she acts under an honest mistake without any
intent to deceive, misrepresents either the quantity or quality of the land
sold, a buyer who justifiably relies on this misrepresentation is entitled to the
difference between the market value of the land had it been as represented
and the market value of the property as it actually was at the time of the
sale."
A finding that innocent silence is actionable, however, would inap-
propriately expand the innocent misrepresentation doctrine; pur-
chaser's reliance on seller's failure to disclose when the seller does
not know of the defect or condition cannot form the basis of liabil-
ity.93 It is to be expected therefore, despite the treatment of nondis-
closure as misrepresentation in other regards, that nondisclosure
where there is a duty to disclose is actionable only if the "silence is
accompanied by deceptive conduct or suppression of material facts
results in active concealment. 94
Some courts have relieved the seller of liability when the contract
contains an "as is" clause. 9' Generally, an "as is" clause will be
90. Boyle v. Odell, 605 A.2d 1260, 1265 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
91. See, e.g., Cousineau v. Walker, 613 P.2d 608, 614 (Alaska 1980) (stating that an owner
guilty of even an innocent misrepresentation should not be able to invoke the doctrine of caveat
emptor); Soursby v. Hawkins, 763 P.2d 725, 728 (Or. 1988) (holding that a real estate purchaser
may rescind even if the vendor innocently misrepresents a material fact so long as the buyer
justifiably relied on the misrepresentation).
92. Tennant v. Lawton, 615 P.2d 1305, 1308 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
93. Soniat v. Johnson-Rast & Hays, 626 So. 2d 1256, 1259 (Ala. 1993) (holding that mere
concealment of a fact unless done in such a manner as to deceive and mislead will not support an
action for deceit); Dee v. Peters, 591 N.E.2d 115, 116 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that used
home vendor's silence in not disclosing alleged defects, standing alone, did not give rise to cause of
action for misrepresentation); Russow v. Bobola, 277 N.E.2d 769, 771 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (stat-
ing that the seller was obligated to disclose the denied request for a subsurface sewage system
permit).
94. Russow, 277 N.E.2d at 771.
95. See, e.g., Atkins v. Kirkpatrick, 823 S.W.2d 547, 553-54 (Tenn. 1991) (stating that where
there is an express allocation of risk to the buyer, the court will apply the ordinary meaning of the
words).
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upheld if the defects are "obvious" or "reasonably discernible." 96 In
the absence of fraud, mutual mistake, or warranty, courts will re-
spect an "as is" clause.97
Most courts, however, disregard the clause where fraud is found
to exist.98 As one leading opinion states:
[Tihe existence of an "as is" clause in a contract of sale for real estate will
not relieve the vendor of his obligation to disclose a condition which substan-
tially affects the value or habitability of the property and which condition is
known to the vendor, but not to the purchaser, and would not be disclosed
by a reasonable and diligent inspection. Such failure to disclose constitutes
fraud."9
In addition to the above-described common law imposition of cer-
tain duties to disclose on sellers of real property, there are also vari-
ous statutory disclosure obligations. 100 Any such statutory duty to
disclose is sufficient also to create the duty for purposes of a com-
mon law fraud action.' 01 Except in the unlikely case of preemption,
the remedy under common law fraud would exist in addition to any
express remedy provided by the statute in question.' If the statute
contains no express remedy and none has been implied by the re-
spective state courts, the existence of the statutory duty would sim-
ply make the aggrieved party's common law action more
96. Mulkey v. Waggoner, 338 S.E.2d 755, 757 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
97. See, e.g., Stidham v. Kinnamon, No. 86C-AP-18, 1988 Del. Super. LEXIS 483, at *11
(Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 29, 1988) (granting summary judgment to vendors for defective property
sold in "as is" condition); Conahan v. Fisher, 463 N.W.2d 118, 119 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (hold-
ing that a termite problem was not concealed and thus, the seller had no duty to disclose the
problem); Kaye v. Buehrle, 457 N.E.2d 373, 376 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (stating that when a buyer
contractually agrees to accept property "as is," the seller is relieved of the duty to disclose unless
there is evidence of an intent to conceal).
98. See, e.g., Rayner v. Wise Realty Co. of Tallahassee, 504 So. 2d 1361, 1364-65 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1987) (recognizing that the "as is" clause is not acceptable when there is evidence that
the exterminator was negligent in submitting termite documentation); Wagner v. Cutler, 757 P.2d
779, 782 (Mont. 1988) (stating that the purchaser of a home is not under a duty to discover latent
defects in the house, despite the "as is" clause); Brewer v. Brothers, 611 N.E.2d 492, 495 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1992) (finding that a vendor who misrepresented the condition of the home's electrical
system could be liable even though the real estate contract contained an "as is" clause); Mancini
v. Gorick, 536 N.E.2d 8, 9-10 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a claim of fraudulent conceal-
ment will overcome an "as is clause" when it becomes the duty of a person to speak in order that
the party with whom he is dealing may be placed on equal footing with him).
99. Stemple v. Dobson, 400 S.E.2d 561, 567 (W. Va. 1990).
100. See infra notes 104-06, 113-15 and accompanying text.
101. Cf. GAUDIO. supra note 8, at 366-67.
102. Cf. GAUDIO, supra note 8, at 366-76. See generally Holcomb v. Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507
(N.D. 1985) (allowing both statutory and common law causes of action by purchaser of residen-
tial real estate with defective sewage, water, and heating systems).
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available.'03
Consumer protection laws are typical required disclosure statutes.
They usually list prohibited acts and allow damages or rescission to
an injured party.10 4 Under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practice
Act, for example, a buyer of residential real estate was awarded
rescission in addition to monetary and punitive damages for injury
resulting from the seller's nondisclosure of defects.105 A Louisiana
statute also allows an injured buyer of real property a remedy
against the seller by providing that "[t] he seller, who knows the vice
of the thing he sells and omits to declare it, besides the restitution of
price and repayment of the expenses, including reasonable attor-
neys' fees, is answerable to the buyer in damages."' 0 6
If the statute fails to provide the damaged party with an express
remedy, courts often refuse to imply such a private right of action
under a consumer protection act.'0 These courts reason that the act
was intended to protect the public as a whole rather than particular
individuals, who are already protected by common law fraud reme-
dies.10 8 In addition, based on the same rationale, courts often refuse
to read the statute's liability provisions expansively.109 Under the
Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, for example, a seller can-
not be held liable to an aggrieved purchaser unless the transaction
occurred in a business context." 0 Factors which are considered by
103. GAUDIO, supra note 8, at 366-67; Rosenthal v. Perkins, 257 S.E.2d 63, 67 (N.C. Ct. App.
1979).
104. Cf. GAUDIO, supra note 8, at 366 (finding that broker activities are covered by consumer
protection laws when the broker's actions affect the public interest protected by the act). But see
D. BARLOW BURKE JR., LAW OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS 213 (Supp. 1991) (suggesting consumer
protection laws are not an appropriate basis for broker, as opposed to seller liability).
105. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-11 Og(a) (West 1994); see Catucci v. Ouellette, 592 A.2d
962, 964 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991) (stating that the seller was obligated to disclose the denied re-
quest for a subsurface sewage system permit).
106. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2545 (West 1994); see Leflore v. Anderson, 537 So. 2d 215, 217
(La. Ct. App. 1988) (awarding purchaser damages for mental anguish and inconvenience as a
result of agent's negligent misrepresentation of condition of the foundation); Davis v. Davis, 353
So. 2d 1060, 1064 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (awarding purchaser damages and attorney fees as a result
of vendor concealing home's tendency to flood).
107. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text (discussing various cases interpreting con-
sumer protection acts within the real estate context).
108. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text (discussing various cases interpreting con-
sumer protection acts within the real estate context).
109. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text (discussing various cases interpreting con-
sumer protection acts within the real estate context).
110. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2 (West 1994), which has been interpreted to
apply only to acts or practices which are carried out in a business context. Lynn v. Nashawaty,
423 N.E.2d 1052, 1054 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
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the Massachusetts courts in determining the existence of a "business
context" include the nature of the transaction, the character of the
parties involved, the activities in which the parties participated, and
whether the transaction is motivated by business or personal rea-
sons.'11 Based on those factors, the sale of a home by another indi-
vidual rarely falls within the statute."' 2 Constructive fraud statutes
are another source of the duty to disclose imposed on a seller of
residential real property. Based on such a statute, the North Dakota
Supreme Court found a seller liable for nondisclosure of defects in a
property's sewage, water and heating systems.118 The North Dakota
statute loosely defines constructive fraud as any breach of duty
which, without actual fraudulent intent, gains an advantage to the
person at fault of misleading another to his prejudice."" The court
further explained that:
in cases of passive concealment by the seller of defective real property, there
is an exception to the rule of caveat emptor . . . which imposes a duty on
the seller to disclose material facts which are known or should be known to
the seller and which would not be discoverable by the buyer's exercise of
ordinary care and diligence. 115
As analyzed at length below, the seventeen real property condi-
tion disclosure acts enacted during the last decade are the most re-
cent statutory developments imposing on the seller of residential real
property some affirmative duty to disclose information to prospective
purchasers.116
B. Obligations Imposed on the Broker
Under the traditional common law, a broker participating in the
sale of real property, like the seller of that offered property, has a
duty to a prospective purchaser to refrain from making any false
representations or actively concealing any defects or other material
facts.11 7 Similarly, mere nondisclosure in the absence of a duty to
11. Nei v. Burley, 446 N.E.2d 674, 680 (Mass. 1983).
112. Id.; see also George v. Kuschwa, No. 207, 1986 WL 18247, at *1 (Del. 1986) (affirming a
lower court's decision which held that in order to maintain an action based on the consumer fraud
act, the buyer must show that the seller is engaged in trade or commerce and that the sale was not
an isolated sale of real estate by an owner); Rosenthal v. Perkins, 257 S.E.2d 63, 67 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1979) ("They did not by the sale of their residence on this one occasion become realtors.").
113. Holcomb v. Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507, 511 (N.D. 1985).
114. ND. CENT. CODE § 9-03-09(1) (1993).
115. Holcomb, 365 N.W.2d at 512.
116. See infra notes 200-344 and accompanying text (discussing the seventeen acts).
117. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of intentional mis-
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speak was not actionable. 118 As detailed above with respect to sell-
ers, however, courts have increasingly imposed a duty to speak
based on partial disclosure, a special relationship (such as agency,
fiduciary, confidential, etc.), or other circumstances.' 1 9 That expan-
sion of a seller's duty to disclose has been gradually extended by
some courts to obligate real estate brokers. 2
Presently, a growing number of courts require brokers participat-
ing in the sale of residential real estate to disclose facts materially
affecting the value or desirability of the offered property, so long as
the facts are known by the broker, and neither known by the pro-
spective purchaser nor available to her through a reasonable inspec-
representation, negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment). See generally GAUDIO,
supra note 8, at §§ 291-302 (discussing the obligations which a broker owes to persons other than
his principal, such as fiduciary duties, breach of contract, fraud and consumer protection). Other
than committing an intentional, affirmative fraud, brokers have few obligations to the purchaser.
Id. at 344; Paul Meyer, Illinois Real Estate Brokers: The Duties of Disclosure and Accuracy, 23
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 241, 243 (1992) (recognizing that under common law, liability for fraudulent
concealment is based not only upon false statements, but also upon intentional concealment and
upon failure to disclose when there is a duty to do so).
118. See, e.g., Franchey v. Hannes, 207 A.2d 268, 271 (Conn. 1965) (finding vendor's silence
with regard to a known defect to be the equivalent of a false representation). The broker is the
agent of the seller, and therefore is usually held not to have a fiduciary duty to anyone else,
including the purchaser. D. BARLOW BURKE JR., LAW OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS 191-217 (1982);
GAUDIO, supra note 8, at 345 (examining the possibility for an agent to act for two persons in a
single transaction). See generally Bryant & Epley, supra note 8 (discussing dual agency and
undisclosed dual agency as it pertains to real estate agents). Brokers have very little incentive
(indeed, significant disincentives) to provide information to the buyer. Kevin C. Culum, Comment,
Hidden-But-Discoverable Defects: Resolving the Conflicts Between Real Estate Buyers and Bro-
kers, 50 MONT. L. REV. 331, 333-34 (1989) (suggesting that brokers should not be allowed to
continue to expect immunity from buyers' causes of action, and that brokers should be compelled
to disclose to the buyer all available information).
Of course, if the broker is the buyer's agent, agency law requires the broker to fully disclose to
the buyer. See, e.g.. Roberts v. Rivera, 458 So. 2d 786, 788-89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (finding
the seller liable for fraudulent concealment of property defects when the brokers failed to disclose
to the buyer material defects in the property); GAUDIO, supra note 8, at 346-47, 352-53 (stating
that failure to fully disclose violates the broker's fiduciary duty); cf Mintz & Mintz Realty Co. v.
Sturm, 419 So. 2d 981, 983 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that even when the broker is not the
agent of the buyer under state statute, the broker has a duty to fully disclose material defects to
the buyer).
119. See GAUDIO, supra note 8, at 346-52 (discussing brokers' fiduciary duties to buyers);
Meyer, supra note 117, at 245-46 (recognizing brokers' position of trust with respect to purchaser
as imposing a good faith duty of disclosure on broker); see also supra notes 43-50 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the establishment of the complete disclosure obligation).
120. GAuDIo, supra note 8, at 344-45. A broker may also be liable for a negligent misrepresen-
tation, i.e., making a statement without actual knowledge. Meyer, supra note 117, at 252-58 (con-
cluding that brokers' duty to disclose is stringent and pertains not only to patent defects but to
latent defects as well); Culum, supra note 118, at 336 (arguing that negligent misrepresentation
theory imposes on brokers a duty to disclose to buyers reasonable and accurate information which
the buyer is justified in expecting).
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tion. 121 Any failure to disclose in accordance with that judicially-
imposed duty constitutes actionable fraud, provided, of course, that
the remaining essential elements of culpability, reasonable reliance,
causation, and damages can be established by the complaining pur-
chaser.12 2 An often-cited leading case concerning a typical real es-
tate broker's duty of disclosure is Lingsch v. Savage,1 23 in which the
California Court of Appeals stated in 1963 that
[t]he real estate agent or broker representing the seller is a party to the
business transaction. In most instances, he has a personal interest in it and
derives a profit from it. Where such agent or broker possesses, along with
the seller, the requisite knowledge ... whether he acquires it from, or inde-
pendently of, his principal, he is under the same duty of disclosure. He is a
party connected with the fraud and if no disclosure is made at all to the
buyer by the other parties to the transaction, such agent or broker becomes
jointly and severally liable with the seller for the full amount of the
damages. " 4
Based on this rationale, the court imposed a broad duty of disclosure
on an involved real estate broker. 2
Similarly, a Florida appellate court, relying on a Florida Supreme
Court decision which imposed a duty on sellers to disclose material
facts, found that a purchaser could bring a cause of action against a
broker for failing to disclose the existence and contents of a termite
inspection report. "  Similarly, in Miles v. McSwegin,1 27 the Ohio
121. See, e.g., Cooper v. Jevne, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that a
cause of action for fraud existed when sales agents failed to disclose structural deficiencies to
purchasers who were ignorant as to the defect). See generally GAUDIO, supra note 8, at 353-65
(exploring liability based on a theory of fraud); Meyer, supra note 117, at 247-49 (concluding
that brokers' duty to disclose is stringent and pertains not only to patent defects but to latent
defects as well); Powell, supra note 45 (stating that a broker has a duty to a prospective buyer to
disclose all material facts); Culum, supra note 118, at 334-35 (suggesting that brokers commit
fraud when they fail to disclose material facts of which they have knowledge and on which the
buyer justifiably relies); Dawn K. McGee, Note, Potential Liability for Misrepresentation in Res-
idential Real Estate Transactions: Let the Broker Beware, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 127 (1988)
(discussing the scope of a broker's duty to a prospective buyer and noting the judicial broadening
of that duty). But see Zeit, supra note 18, at 171 (discussing the Maryland law which does not
require a broker to disclose known defects to a potential buyer).
122. GAUDIO. supra note 8, at 353; see also supra note 39 (defining the elements necessary to
constitute fraudulent nondisclosure).
123. Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963).
124. Id. at 205 (footnotes omitted).
125. Id. at 204.
126. Rayner v. Wise Realty Co., 504 So. 2d 1361, 1362, 1364 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
(relying on Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985)). While the Florida Supreme Court did
not specifically address the issue of broker's liability in Johnson, the lower court had stated in
dicta that the same duty applied to real estate brokers. Id. at 1364.
127. Miles v. McSwegin, 388 N.E.2d 1367 (Ohio 1979).
DEPA UL LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court affirmed a'lower court ruling in favor of the buyer
where the broker, upon receiving information regarding termite in-
festation, failed to disclose the information to the buyer. Citing the
Restatement of Torts, the Court stated that:
[A] party is under a duty to speak, and therefore liable for non-disclosure, if
the party fails to exercise reasonable care to disclose a material fact which
may justifiably induce another party to act or refrain from acting, and the
non-disclosing party knows that the failure to disclose such information to
the other party will render a prior statement or representation untrue or
misleading. 128
In all of the above instances of recovery, the broker was aware of
the material nondisclosed information.1 29
In view of the customary lack of any sort of confidential relation-
ship between a prospective purchaser and the selling broker, it has
been difficult for common law courts to logically impose a duty to
disclose on the broker, or even to extend the seller's duty to the real
estate broker.130 Although some courts have refused to hold a broker
liable on such grounds, most agree with the Lingsch court that an
actionable real estate fraud case "does not require privity of con-
tract." 131 For example, a Delaware trial court stated:
[T]hat the defendant ... is the listing broker, and not the vendor does not
affect this duty. If a broker engaged to sell induces a third person to
purchase by means of fraud, he may be liable to the person for loss suffered
as a consequence [as if he were the vendor]. 1 2
A New Mexico appellate court is in accord, stating that the broker
had a duty to disclose to the buyers and that no direct contract was
required between the broker and the buyers because "liability lies in
128. Id. at 1369 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(l)(2) (1977)).
129. See generally GAUDIO, supra note 8, at 356-59 (recognizing that the broker has a duty to
reveal to a prospective purchaser the existence of a material defect).
130. Id. at 344 (stating that courts have had considerable difficulty in enunciating a single,
clear rational to explain the brokers' duties).
131. Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 205 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) (citing Nathanson v.
Murphy, 282 P.2d 174, 178 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955)); see also GAUDIO, supra note 8, at 344 (stating
that the brokers' duties arise out of his agency relationship and run to the benefit of his principal,
traditionally the seller). But see Zeit, supra note 18, at 167-68 (discussing a Maryland law which
allows for a cause of action only when there exists a "special relationship" between the broker and
purchaser).
132. Lock v. Schreppler, 426 A.2d 856, 862 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981). The defendant-broker had
sought summary judgment but the court denied the motion. Id. at 860. The court relied on the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 348, 529, 550, and other states' decisions, most notably
Sawyer v. Tildahl, 148 N.W.2d 131 (Minn. 1967) and Shane v. Hoffmann, 324 A.2d 532 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1974). Lock, 426 A.2d at 862.
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tort for negligent misrepresentation." 133 Also, the Ohio Supreme
Court, as noted above in Miles v. McSwegin,13 4 held that because
the buyers had relied on the broker's nondisclosure, no special rela-
tionship was required to find the broker liable to them.'3 5
Courts have normally found that brokers have a duty not to mis-
lead the buyer by providing only partial or incomplete material in-
formation in response to a prospective purchaser's inquiry.13 6 In a
case involving property that contained a defective heating and air
conditioning system, the Alabama Supreme Court held that when
the buyer made a direct inquiry about that system prior to closing,
the broker became obligated to disclose fully as to that material
matter.137 Similarly, a Delaware trial court held in Lock v. Schrep-
pier 8' that "[o]nce the broker undertook to inform the plaintiffs of
the termite problem, he had a duty to fully inform the plaintiffs so
as not to mislead them with inadequate information."'1 39
As with a seller, liability cannot be found against a broker unless
all of the remaining elements of fraud, including culpability, reason-
able reliance and causation, are proved. 40 The required standard of
133. Gouveia v. Citicorp Person-To-Person Fin. Ctr., Inc., 686 P.2d 262, 266 (N.M. Ct. App.
1984). See generally McGee, supra note 121, at 127 n.2 (compiling cases in states that have
addressed broker liability in misrepresentation actions based on a broker's failure to inform a
buyer of defects in residential real estate).
134. 388 N.E.2d 1367 (Ohio 1979).
135. Id. at 1370 (imposing liability where the material defect was termite infestation).
136. GAUDIO, supra note 8, at 356-59 (failing to speak when one should is constructively the
same as an affirmative misstatement).
137. Fennell Realty Co. v. Martin, 529 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Ala. 1988).
138. 426 A.2d 856 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981).
139. Id. at 862; see also Ditcharo v. Stepanek, 538 So. 2d 309, 313 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (find-
ing that a broker has the duty to relay accurate information about the property he is selling);
Maxwell v. Ratcliffe, 254 N.E.2d 250, 252 (Mass. 1969) (noting that where the buyers had ex-
amined the house and raised the question of the dryness of the cellar, the brokers had a special
obligation to avoid half-truths concerning periodic water seepage and to make disclosure at least
of any facts known to them or of which they had been put on notice); Corazalla v. Quie, 473
N.W.2d 347, 350 (Minn. Ct. App.) (stating that if the broker undertakes to speak, he must say
enough to prevent words from misleading the other party), rev'd on other grounds, 478 N.W.2d
197 (Minn. 1991); Hoffman v. Connall, 736 P.2d 242, 245 (Wash. 1987) (reaffirming the rule set
out in Tennant); Tennant v. Lawton, 615 P.2d 1305, 1309 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) ("The underly-
ing rationale of his duty to a buyer who is not his client is that he is a professional who is in a
unique position to verify critical information given him by the seller. His duty is to take reasona-
ble steps to avoid disseminating to the buyer false information.").
140. GAUDIo. supra note 8, at 353 (asserting that in order to recover on the theory of fraud, a
buyer must prove the requisite elements); Meyer, supra note 117, at 243 (finding that fraud con-
sists of a false statement of material facts, that the party knew or believed to be false, and that the
other party justifiably relied on the misrepresentation); see supra note 39 and accompanying text
(listing the various elements needed to prove fraudulent nondisclosure).
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culpability is an intent to deceive or, in a growing number of juris-
dictions, a reckless or negligent disregard of the facts. 141 Accord-
ingly, where a broker merely relays information received from a
seller, courts often have difficulty finding the required intent or neg-
ligence to support liability for what seems to be an innocent misrep-
resentation or omission. 142 In a case involving a defective roof, for
example, the Alabama Supreme Court refused to hold the broker
liable stating that the brokers would not be held liable in fraud "for
merely conveying the statements of their principal to the agent of
the [buyers], there being no evidence of bad faith on her part.' 48
Yet there are at least four jurisdictions in which courts have held
that a buyer may sometimes have a cause of action against a broker
for an innocent misrepresentation. 144 An underlying rationale, as ex-
plained by the Alaska Supreme Court in Bevins v. Ballard,4 5 is that
brokers are licensed professionals possessing superior knowledge of
141. For examples of cases which have found culpability for reckless or negligent omission of a
material fact, see supra note 91.
142. See infra note 143 (noting jurisdictions that will not find liability where the broker relies
on the seller's statement).
143. Speigner v. Howard, 502 So. 2d 367, 371 (Ala. 1987); see also Hope v. Brannan, 557 So.
2d 1208, 1211 (Ala. 1989) (quoting Speigner, 502 So.2d at 370-71); Provost v. Miller, 473 A.2d
1162, 1163-64 (Vt. 1984) (stating that a broker is guilty of negligent misrepresentation only if he
or she passes information from a seller to a buyer that he or she knows or has reason to know may
be untrue); Hoffmann, 736 P.2d at 246 (holding that real estate agents and brokers are not liable
for innocently and non-negligently conveying seller's misrepresentations to the buyer). But cf
Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 599 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (holding that
under common law principal agent law, the broker will not be personally liable for damages for
deceit if he honestly believes that the representations made by him to induce the third party
purchaser were true), rev'd, 618 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1981) (holding that the common law doctrine
used above was superseded by a Texas statute which holds the broker liable in the same capacity
as the principal).
144. Those jurisdictions include Alaska, Wisconsin, Minnesota and Ohio. See Gauerke v.
Rozga, 332 N.W.2d 804 (Wis. 1983); see also infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Alaska, Ohio and Minnesota cases so holding).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines innocent misrepresentation as:
One who, in a sale, rental or exchange transaction with another, makes a misrepresen-
tation of a material fact for the purpose of inducing the other to act or to refrain from
acting in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other for pecuniary loss caused
to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, even though it is not
made fraudulently or negligently.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977); see Culum, supra note 118, at 337-38 (dis-
cussing that some jurisdictions impose liability on brokers for innocently disclosing false informa-
tion which materially effects buyer's decision to purchase); Zeit, supra note 18, at 169 (recogniz-
ing that some jurisdictions hold the broker strictly liable for incorrect, albeit innocent, information
passed on to the buyer). For a more complete discussion of innocent misrepresentation, see
Clarance E. Hagglund & Britton D. Weimer, Caveat Realtor. The Broker's Liability for Negli-
gent and Innocent Misrepresentations, 20 REAL EST. L.J. 149, 153 (1991).
145. Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1982).
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the real property for sale and real estate in general upon which buy-
ers usually rely. 4 6
As the above discussion makes clear, some courts have imposed
upon brokers participating in a real estate transaction a common
law duty to disclose facts relating to any material defects or other
material information known to the broker. Recently, a few courts
have gone so far as to impose on brokers a duty to disclose not only
known defects but also defects that are reasonably discoverable in
the exercise of reasonable care. 4 In other words, some courts may
find liability for a material nondisclosure based upon the broker's
negligent failure to discover and thereafter disclose such informa-
tion. " 8 This broadening of the action of common law fraud amounts
to the imposition of a duty on brokers to exercise reasonable care by
inspecting the premises being sold.
In 1984, the California Court of Appeals, in the landmark case of
Easton v. Strassburger," 9 became the first to articulate this new
duty. The court expressly imposed the obligation upon selling bro-
kers to diligently inspect the property offered for sale and to disclose
to prospective purchasers all facts materially affecting the value or
desirability of the property that such an inspection would reveal. In
Easton, the plaintiffs purchased a home on a one acre parcel of land
which suffered massive earth movement shortly after the buyer took
possession. 50 Due to improperly engineered and compacted filled
soil, a portion of the property began to slide away causing damage
to a driveway and resulting in cracks in walls and warped door-
146. Id. at 763; Spargnapani v. Wright, 110 A.2d 82, 85 (D.C. 1954) (approving reliance by
the buyer on the broker's pretense of knowledge); Berryman v. Riegert, 175 N.W.2d 438, 442
(Minn. 1970) (finding that an inexperienced buyer has the right to rely upon an experienced
broker); Pumphrey v. Quillen, 135 N.E.2d 328, 331 (Ohio 1956) (holding that a buyer may rely
upon the knowledge implied by an assertion of fact by a broker); Polk Terrace, Inc. v. Harper,
386 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (relying on Bell v. Bradshaw, 342 S.W.2d 185 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1960), which recognized the difference between a skillful seller and an ignorant buyer,
to hold the broker liable).
147. See generally GAUDIO, supra note 8, at 359-65 (discussing that, acting as a "reasonable
person," the broker should establish formalized procedures to detect defects).
148. Id. at 362 (claiming that negligent misrepresentation occurs when a broker makes a state-
ment without knowing whether the statement is true or false); Meyer, supra note 117, at 253-55
(suggesting that stringent duty placed on brokers for accurate disclosure imposes the additional
duty to discover, investigate, and obtain actual knowledge prior to making statements); Culum,
supra note 118, at 334-39 (suggesting that one way for brokers to avoid liability is by investigat-
ing sellers' representations).
149. Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
150. Id. at 385.
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ways. 151 Estimates of the cost to repair the damage were as much as
$40,000 above the $170,000 purchase price. 152 The sellers had not
informed their agents of any prior earth movements or of their at-
tempts at correcting the problem.515 It was uncontested, however,
that the listing agents had conducted several inspections of the prop-
erty prior to the sale and had observed warning signs indicating po-
tential soil problems.1 54 Nevertheless, none of the agents tested the
soil or informed prospective buyers of the potential soil problems.155
The plaintiff purchasers based their action for damages not on
intentional misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment, but rather
on simple negligence. They argued that the brokers had a legal duty
to use due care to discover and disclose defects and that their
breach of that duty was the proximate cause of the damages suf-
fered. 5 Thus, the court's inquiry was whether the broker's duty of
care in a residential real estate transaction includes the duty to con-
duct a reasonably competent and diligent inspection of the property
listed for sale in order to discover defects for the benefit of the
buyer. 157 While the opinion acknowledged that no court had as yet
actually held that a broker has a duty to disclose material facts
which she should have known, the Easton court concluded that
"such a duty is implicit in the rule articulated in Cooper and
Lingsch, which speaks not only to facts known by the broker, but
also and independently to facts that are accessible only to him and
his principal."158 In so holding, the court noted that its primary pur-
poses in imposing this broader duty on brokers were to maintain the
integrity of the rule set out in Cooper and Lingsch, "to protect the
buyer from the unethical broker and seller and to insure that the
buyer is provided sufficient accurate information to make an in-
formed decision whether to purchase.""
The Easton court enormously expanded the common law in Cali-
fornia to require for the first time that members of the real estate
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 386.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 386-87.
157. Id. at 387.
158. Id. at 388.
159. Id.; see also Gouveia v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Fin. Ctr., Inc., 686 P.2d 262, 267
(N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the brokers' status as listing broker did not relieve them of
their obligation to prospective purchasers with respect to known or discoverable defects).
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brokerage industry conduct a reasonably diligent inspection of prop-
erty offered for sale and disclose the fruits of that inspection to pro-
spective purchasers. This doctrine has been rejected by all but a few
of the jurisdictions that have since considered it.160
Since most courts outside of California have declined to impose
an Easton duty of inspection and disclosure on brokers, plaintiffs
desirous of recovering under common law fraud often look to state
statutes as a source of the broker inspection and disclosure require-
ment. In addition to consumer protection and other statutes men-
tioned in connection with the disclosure duties of sellers,1"1 real es-
tate licensing laws seem the natural choice. 16" However, real estate
licensing laws are not helpful in most cases since usually they
neither expressly call for inspection and disclosure of unknown de-
fects, 168 nor contain any private right of action.18 4
160. Blackmon v. First Real Estate Corp., 529 So. 2d 955, 956 (Ala. 1988) (reaffirming the
doctrine of caveat emptor); Munjal v. Baird & Warner, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 855, 864 (Ill. App. Ct.
1985) (declining to recognize a broker's duty to discover undisclosed defects); see also Harkala v.
Wildwood Realty, Inc., 558 N.E.2d 195, 200 (Il1. App. Ct. 1990) (reaffirming Munjal); Provost v.
Miller, 473 A.2d 1162, 1163-64 (Vt. 1984) (reversing a lower court ruling stating that the jury
instruction stating that jurors "must find the brokers negligent if they failed to discover a struc-
tural defect in the house that could have been discovered by using reasonable diligence," was
erroneous). Contra Naquin v. Robert, 559 So. 2d 18, 20-21 (La. Ct. App.) (recognizing a broker's
duty to communicate accurate information he knew or should have known to the purchaser, seller
or both), cert. denied, 561 So. 2d 118 (La. 1990).
161. See supra notes 104-12 and accompanying text (discussing consumer protection statutes);
see generally GAUDIO. supra note 8, at 366-67 (referring to consumer fraud acts or deceptive
trade practices acts as the appropriate legislative means for protecting consumers from fraudulent
or deceptive practices); Meyer, supra note 117, at 241-42, 258-65 (suggesting that courts and
legislatures have been willing to increase brokers' duties to prospective buyers).
162. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Earl Thacker Co., 716 P.2d 163, 166 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986) (allowing
the revocation of a broker's license due to misrepresentation of a material fact); Zimmerman v.
Northfield Real Estate, Inc., 510 N.E.2d 409 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (recognizing a cause of action
under the Real Estate Broker's and Salesman Licensing Act for misrepresentation); Pride Mark
Realty v. Mullins, 352 A.2d 866, 871 n.1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976) (citing a state statute which
allows the suspension of a broker's license for nondisclosure of a material fact); Dugan v. Jones,
615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980) (allowing revocation of broker's license for misrepresentation).
See generally GAUDIO, supra note 8, at 365-66 (emphasizing that a broker owes a duty to all
members of the public with whom he deals). But see Kubinsky v. Van Zandt Realtors, 811
S.W.2d 711, 714 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that because a real estate broker has no duty to
inspect there is no liability for failure to disclose under the Texas Real Estate Licensing Act).
163. See, e.g., TEx. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6573 a(15)(a)(6)(a) (West 1994) (attaching liability
only where the defect was latent and/or known to the broker).
164. See Lock v. Schreppler, 426 A.2d 856, 866-67 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981) (holding that Real
Estate Commission regulatory statutes did not create a private cause of action); Brunett v. Al-
brecht, 810 P.2d 276, 282-83 (Kan. 1991) (finding that the statute did not provide for a private
cause of action); see also GAUDIO, supra note 8, at 366 (finding that maintaining a private cause
of action based solely on the licensing statute was inconsistent with the legislative scheme);
Meyer, supra note 117, at 267 (arguing that the Real Estate License Act of 1983 removed private
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As analyzed at length below, one of the most relevant statutory
developments relating to the duties of brokers involved in the sale of
residential real property is the codification and narrowing of Easton
by the California legislature in 1986.165 Similarly, the subsequent
enactment of sixteen other real property condition disclosure acts
which interrupt any judicial efforts to extend the duty of complete
disclosure to members of the real estate brokerage industry has sig-
nificantly impacted the duties of residential real estate brokers.'66
C. Obligations Imposed on the Purchaser
As stated above, any person desiring to exercise his or her inher-
ent common law right to purchase, own and enjoy residential real
property is protected by those contract, tort, and other doctrines ap-
plicable to real estate sales transactions. Essentially, the common
law provides an aggrieved purchaser with causes of action for
breach of any provision contained in and surviving the underlying
agreement of sale, and for fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent
concealment. Now, in a growing number of jurisdictions, even
fraudulent nondisclosure of material defects or other information
may be actionable.167
The common law of all jurisdictions, with the arguable exception
of California, falls short of guaranteeing that a prospective pur-
chaser of residential real property is provided with all information
relevant to his or her determination of the value and desirability of
the property offered for sale. 168 Indeed, at the extreme, the New
York courts have declined to impose any affirmative duty to dis-
close, leaving the doctrine of caveat emptor totally intact. 169 Ac-
rights of action and afforded brokers added protection); Zeit, supra note 18, at 170 (discussing the
Maryland broker licensing statutes which provide for revocation of a license rather that liability to
an injured party).
165. See infra notes 200-36 and accompanying text (discussing the Easton decision and the
California legislation).
166. See infra notes 237-305 and accompanying text (discussing the subsequent disclosure
articles).
167. See supra notes 34-36, 39 (listing the elements necessary for common law tort actions).
168. GAUDIO. supra note 8, at 364-65 (claiming that courts are reluctant to hold brokers re-
sponsible for their unintentional failure to disclose).
169. Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672, 675 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (applying a strict
rule of caveat emptor by failing to recognize any remedy for damages incurred by seller's mere
silence); see also Herbert v. Saffell, 877 F.2d 267, 272-73 (4th Cir. 1989) (denying recovery when
purchaser failed to exercise ordinary care during the inspection); Blackmon v. First Real Estate
Corp., 529 So. 2d 955, 956-57 (Ala. 1988) (finding that broker has no duty to inspect for patent
defects); Powell, supra note 45, at 139-40 (discussing application of the caveat emptor doctrine in
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cordingly, every potential purchaser of residential real estate regard-
less of the jurisdiction is well-advised to assume a duty to undertake
a complete and diligent investigation of the property itself and of all
other sources of information- relative to its value and desirability.
That investigation should include a thorough inspection of the prem-
ises itself, the employment of any experts warranted by the age,
condition, etc. of the property, as well as the assistance of exper-
ienced real estate legal counsel.
Although the primary purpose of a prospective purchaser's inves-
tigation is to avoid purchasing a property for more than its fair
value, it is also invaluable to a purchaser attempting to recover
damages from a seller or broker who either misrepresented a mate-
rial fact or failed to disclose a material fact where a duty to speak
existed. Specifically, a purchaser who has completed an inspection is
in a better position to establish the elements of reasonable reliance
and causation also necessary to prevail in common law fraud.
Whether the fraudulent act be misrepresentation or unlawful omis-
sion, the element of justifiable reliance is often the stumbling block
unless the defrauded purchaser has made a reasonably diligent in-
vestigation of the premises for patent defects discoverable as a result
of such an inspection. 170 The need for buyer investigation is espe-
a care where the buyer's reliance on a realtor's misrepresentations was unjustified).
170. Hope v. Brannan, 557 So. 2d 1208, 1211 (Ala. 1990) (holding that the purchaser's failure
to inspect negated his cause of action for fraud); Turner v. Cobb, 356 S.E.2d 749, 750 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1987) (denying recovery to a plaintiff who failed to exercise ordinary care in discovering
potential flooding despite being put on notice of such problem); Connor v. Merrill Lynch Realty,
Inc., 581 N.E.2d 196, 201 (Il. App. Ct. 1991) (denying recovery to purchaser where brokers had
recommended a home inspection regarding a potential flood problem); Hommerding v. Peterson,
376 N.W.2d 456, 459 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that the sufficiency of the water supply was
discoverable by the vendee and therefore negated his cause of action); Hinson v. Jefferson, 215
S.E.2d 102, 111 (N.C. 1975) (holding the purchaser bound by defects that a reasonable investiga-
tion would have disclosed); Foust v. Valleybrook Realty Co., 446 N.E.2d 1122, 1125 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1981) (stating that a person has a duty to reasonably investigate before reliance thereon);
Gutelius v. Sisemore, 365 P.2d 732, 735 (Okla. 1961) (denying recovery to buyers who fail to
exercise ordinary diligence in inspection); Silva v. Stevens, 589 A.2d 852, 858 (Vt. 1991) (citing
the general rule requiring a purchaser to investigate); see also Davis v. Davis, 353 So. 2d 1060,
1063 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (granting recovery to purchaser of a flood prone house where defect was
not discoverable and purchasers had made flood-related inquiries).
Of course, these rules should not apply when the buyer is prevented from making an investiga-
tion through misrepresentation or some other fraud of seller. Goldsten v. Burka, 43 A.2d 712, 713
(D.C. 1945) (misrepresentation); Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 627-28 (Fla. 1985) (misrepre-
sentation); Wiederhold v. Smith, 418 S.E.2d 141, 143 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (passive concealment);
Wilhite v. Mays, 232 S.E.2d 141, 143 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976) (passive concealment); Scharf v.
Tiegerman, 561 N.Y.S.2d 271, 272 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (nondisclosure); Holcomb v. Zinke,
365 N.W.2d 507, 512 (N.D. 1985) (passive concealment).
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cially strong where there are warning signs alerting him or her to a
possible defect. As one court opined, "where one is put on notice as
to any doubt to the truth of the representation, the person is under a
duty to reasonably investigate before reliance thereon. 171
Although the doctrine of caveat emptor has been much eroded in
most jurisdictions, some courts continue to have a substantial bias in
favor of the principles underlying that doctrine, and they endeavor
to embrace it to limit or bar real estate fraud actions.1 7 In George
v. Lumbrazo,17 3 for example, the court stated that "[p]roof of active
concealment alone, however, will not support a fraud action where
the vendee should have known of the defect."17' Likewise, in Farm
Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wood' 5 the court stated that pur-
chaser's knowledge of a concealed defect relieves the seller of any
duty or liability for injuries. 17 16 In Brown v. B & D Land Co.,' 77 a
buyer's fraud claim based on seller's failure to disclose the prop-
erty's flood plain location failed because the truth regarding the
property was readily available upon inquiry.' 8 And in Layman v.
171. Foust, 446 N.E.2d at 1125; see also Turner, 356 S.E.2d at 750 (denying recovery where
plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary care); Connor, 581 N.E.2d at 201 (asserting that the buyer
was placed on notice that the basement flooded based on visibility of water marks); Thompson v.
Best, 478 N.E.2d 79, 84 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (holding the buyer partially responsible based on
his awareness of sump pump defect); Christopher v. Evans, 361 N.W.2d 193, 197 (Neb. 1985)
(holding that the seller's suggestion regarding fill around foundation of the house alerted buyer to
a possible water problem); Armentrout v. French, 258 S.E.2d 519, 524 (Va. 1979) (requiring
buyer to discover the true condition of the property when placed on notice of a defect). See gener-
ally GAUDIO, supra note 8, at 109 (Supp. 1993) (finding that the broker must make a reasonable
investigation to discover the property's condition and has a duty to disclose defects the purchaser).
See also Curnes, supra note 45, at 461-63, 466-67, 474-75 (discussing the efforts required by a
prospective purchaser to discover defects).
172. Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, applying Maryland
law, reaffirmed the doctrine of caveat emptor. Herbert, 877 F.2d at 267. See generally Zeit, supra
note 18, at 166 (discussing the Maryland real estate law which adheres to the doctrine of caveat
emptor and holds that a broker has no affirmative duty to inspect or report defects of a property).
173. George v. Lumbrazo, 584 N.Y.S.2d 704 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
174. Id. at 705; see also Evans v. Teakettle Realty, 736 P.2d 472, 474 (Mont. 1987) (reducing
damages awarded to purchaser due to purchaser's own comparative negligence).
175. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wood, 418 N.W.2d 408 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
176. Id. at 411; see also Powell, supra note 45, at 140 (describing cases in which buyer stated
that he was prepared to litigate zoning issues, which implied he did not rely on misrepresentation
by realtors as to use of the property).
177. Brown v. B & D Land Co., 823 P.2d 380 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991).
178. Id. at 382; see also Pakrul v. Barnes, 631 S.W.2d 436, 438 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (deny-
ing recovery where buyer had an opportunity to discover the defect); Kuczmanski v. Gill, 302
S.E.2d 48, 50 (Va. 1983) (denying the buyer's recovery because seller made no representation to
divert him from making an inquiry and an investigation would have given the buyer the true
facts). But see Combs v. Loebner, 846 P.2d 401 (Or. 1993) (declining to require an independent
investigation by the buyer).
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Binns,1 9 a misrepresentation about a condition that would have
been observed had the purchaser chosen to look was held "not so
reprehensible in nature as to constitute fraud." 80 A buyer who
makes an independent investigation will be charged with knowledge
of facts which reasonable diligence would have disclosed.1 8 Accord-
ingly, a sensible buyer, especially in New York, but even in Califor-
nia, should continue to pay heed to the maxim of let the buyer be-
ware. In practice, potential buyers should take care by undertaking
a diligent inspection designed both to ferret out defects and to maxi-
mize the odds for any potentially available remedy in common law
fraud.
II. STATUTORY DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS
On February 22, 1984, as more fully set forth above, a California
Court of Appeals ruled in the landmark case of Easton v. Strass-
burger' that a real estate broker acting for a seller of residential
real property has an "affirmative duty to conduct a reasonably com-
petent and diligent inspection of the residential property listed for
sale and to disclose to prospective purchasers all facts materially
affecting the value or desirability of the property that such an inves-
tigation would reveal."' 8 At the time Easton was decided, state
courts, including those in California, had repeatedly analyzed the
179. Layman v. Binns, 519 N.E.2d 642 (Ohio 1988).
180. Id. at 643-44; see Meyer, supra note 117, at 253 n.71 (suggesting that if a broker becomes
aware of latent defects by observation, such evidence should be equally apparent to purchasers
and, therefore, the broker's obligation to make investigations or disclose should be limited if not
eliminated).
181. Epperson v. Roloff, 719 P.2d 799, 803 (Nev. 1986); cf Cohen v. Vivian, 349 P.2d 366,
368 (Colo. 1960) (holding that an inspection by a purchaser which does not disclose the defect
does not render inapplicable the rule requiring disclosure of a latent defect). Generally, the buyer
is presumed to have relied on what was learned from the inspection and not on the seller's misrep-
resentation. See Mobley v. Copeland, 828 S.W.2d 717, 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (denying recov-
ery where the defects were reasonably discoverable by the purchaser); Gutelius v. Sizemore, 365
P.2d 732, 734 (Okla. 1961) (holding that a seller's silence does not equal fraud when the defect in
question was observable by the buyer); Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124, 126
(Utah 1982) (denying recovery where the buyer had inspected the house and could have discov-
ered the defect through a diligent investigation); Boris v. Hill, 375 S.E.2d 716, 718 (Va. 1989)
(precluding recovery by buyer where examination of the land would have revealed a defective
septic tank); Rockley Manor v. Strimbeck, 382 S.E.2d 507, 509-10 (W. Va. 1989) (denying
buyer's recovery where a thorough examination of the land records would have uncovered the
boundary dispute).
182. Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
183. Id. at 390 (footnotes omitted). For a more detailed discussion of Easton, see supra text
accompanying notes 149-59.
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applicability of the common law torts of fraudulent concealment,
intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation to
cases of nondisclosure of property defects. 8 Since an essential ele-
ment for the establishment of common law fraud in a nondisclosure
(rather than a false disclosure) case is the existence of a duty to
disclose,18 5 erosion of the early doctrine of caveat emptorl8 required
the courts to define and rationalize the imposition of such a duty on
the owner, the selling broker, or others participating in the sale of
the offered property.
By the time Easton came before the California appellate court,
the scope of a real estate broker's duty to disclose material informa-
tion to a prospective purchaser had been expanded to match that of
a seller. The court simply reiterated that
[i]t is not disputed that current law requires a broker to disclose to a buyer
material defects known to the broker but unknown to and unobservable by
the buyer . . . . If a broker fails to disclose material facts that are known to
him he is liable for the intentional tort of 'fraudulent concealment'.
18 7
No court, in California or elsewhere, however, at the time of Easton
had yet interpreted a broker's duty to disclose known defects as in-
cluding an obligation to conduct a reasonably competent and dili-
gent inspection of the property. Further, no court had found, based
on the imposition of such a duty, that a broker is liable to a buyer
for negligently failing to disclose such discoverable information.188
By so deciding, the Easton court took a giant step in expanding, if
not creating, a remedy for not only a seller's, but also a real estate
broker's, negligent failure to disclose reasonably discoverable defects
or other adverse material information to a prospective buyer of the
residential real property.189
In July of 1985, California became the first state to enact legisla-
184. Paula C. Murray, The Real Estate Broker and the Buyer: Negligence and the Duty to
Investigate, 32 VILL. L. REV. 939, 941-42 (1987); see supra notes 40-166 (discussing the state
courts' approach to common law torts).
185. See Hagglund & Weimer, supra note 144, at 149-57 (discussing decisions applying the
doctrine of negligent and innocent misrepresentations and the existence of the duty to disclose in
broker-purchaser communications).
186. For a discussion of the role of caveat emptor in real estate transactions, see supra notes
169-81 and accompanying text.
187. Easton, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
188. Paula C. Murray, Aids, Ghosts, Murder: Must Real Estate Brokers and Sellers Dis-
close?, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689, 692 (1992).
189. Easton, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 387-88.
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tion specifically in this area.19 ° The legislature acted largely in re-
sponse to outcries from real estate brokers who reacted to the Eas-
ton court's expansive view of their duties to inspect and disclose. 91
Under the sponsorship of the California Association of Realtors, 92
the California legislature approved the first, and still the most com-
prehensive, real property condition disclosure legislation. 9  It be-
came operative January 1, 1986, with respect to brokers and Janu-
ary 1, 1987 with regard to sellers. 94 The legislature intended to
"codify and make precise,"' 95 but arguably also to limit, certain as-
pects of the Easton decision. 96
The California legislature did not address the issues of whether,
to what extent, and by what means the sale of residential real prop-
erty should be regulated for the protection of purchasers. Unlike the
United States Congress in 1933, when it decided to protect investors
in securities by creating an entirely new federal regulatory
scheme, 97 the California legislature did not begin with a clean
slate. Rather, it faced a body of evolving common law doctrines cul-
minating with the Easton conclusion that the appropriate method of
regulation was to require the complete and accurate disclosure of all
reasonably discoverable facts material to the value or desirability of
the offered property. The court arrived at that conclusion by broadly
construing the scope of the duties owed to a purchaser of residential
real estate alleging negligent fraud. 98
The California legislature chose to largely embrace, rather than
190. See generally Culum, supra note 118, at 339-41 (discussing a California statute which
limits broker's duty to a visual inspection including only those areas that are reasonably accessible
to such an inspection). A number of states have placed other obligations on brokers by statute.
GAUDIO, supra note 8, at 366 (requiring that the broker deliver a copy of the listing agreement to
the principal and advise purchasers of their right to have an attorney examine title, and stating
that brokers may not engage in the unauthorized practice of law).
191. Murray, supra note 188, at 692-93.
192. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, PROPERTY CONDITION DISCLOSURE (1993) (on file
with the author).
193. S.B. 453, ch. 223, § 4 (1985) (codified at CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1102-1102.15, 2079-
2079.10 (West 1994)); see also Joel M. King, Note, Broker Liability After Easton v. Strass-
burger: Let the Buyer Be Aware, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 651, 660-62 (1985) (discussing the
passing of California Senate Bill No. 453).
194. King, supra note 193, at 660.
195. S.B. 453, ch. 223, § 4 (1985).
196. For a discussion of the limitations, see infra text accompanying notes 223-25 and 341-45.
197. For a discussion of the history of this analogous body of securities law regulation by dis-
closure, see Barbara A. Ash, Reorganizations and Other Exchanges Under Section 3(a)(O) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 1-4 (1980).
198. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (quoting Easton's fraud requirement).
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reject, the expanded property condition disclosure requirements laid
down by the Easton court. 199 As explained below, however, in an
effort to set objective, easily understood guidelines for making full
and fair disclosure, the legislature may have created a statutory
scheme that falls short of what Easton requires. As a consequence,
the statute may be interpreted by the courts as having effectively
limited the impact of the Easton opinion. Since California's enact-
ment of its mandatory property condition disclosure legislation in
1985, a total of sixteen other states have adopted a form of such
regulation, albeit in every case very much less comprehensive and
(with a single exception) not until their 1992 or 1993 legislative
terms.
A. The California Statutory Approach
Two statutes (collectively the "California Act") were enacted in
response to Easton. The first is entitled "Article 1.5. Disclosures
Upon Transfer of Residential Property" (the "Disclosure Arti-
cle").2 00 The second is entitled "Article 2. Duty to Prospective Pur-
chaser of Residential Property" (the "Broker Duty Article")2 0 1 The
statutes are applicable to all sales and related transfers0 2 for
value 20 3 of residential real property or residential stock cooperatives
containing four or fewer dwelling units. The Broker Duty Article, of
course, only applies to such sales and transfers involving a licensed
real estate broker.2 04 The California Act, unlike most of its progeny,
applies to all sales of new or never occupied residences as well as to
all resales.2 °
With respect to the above-described broad categories of sales
transactions, the California Act codifies in a more specific form cer-
199. See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text (discussing the California legislature's in-
tentions for Senate Bill 453).
200. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1102-1102.15 (West Supp. 1994).
201. Id. §§ 2079-2079.10.
202. Section 1102 makes clear that "this article applies to any transfer by sale, exchange, in-
stallment land sale contract . . . lease with an option to purchase, any other option to purchase, or
ground lease coupled with improvements, of real property .... " Id. § 1102.
203. Section 1102.1 excepts from the scope of the article certain categories of transfers that are
unlike voluntary sales in that they are not for value, but rather result from default on a mortgage,
court order, death of an owner, etc. Id. § 1102.1. These exemptions presumably derive from the
legislators' reasonable assumption that these transferees are making no investment decisions and
therefore would not benefit from the article's mandateddisclosure.
204. Id. § 2079.
205. Id. § 1102; see infra notes 248, 267, 281, 296, and 318 and accompanying text (discussing
Acts in Virginia, Wisconsin, Kentucky, Alaska, and seven of the later Acts, respectively).
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tain of the disclosure obligations mandated by the Easton opinion.
First, the Disclosure Article requires the seller or other transferor
subject to the statute, 20 6 as well as any broker involved in the trans-
action, to obtain 0 7 and timely deliver 0 8 a disclosure statement in
the prescribed form.209 The seller and broker must also complete or
cause to be completed Seller's Information, Section II of the disclos-
ure statement, by answering all of the numerous detailed questions
about the property's structural characteristics and their condition,
and about legal restrictions, zoning and similar matters relating to
the property. 10 A copy of the California statutory disclosure state-
ment form appears as an Appendix to this article.
Given the Easton holding, it is noteworthy that neither the statu-
torily mandated form nor any other provision of the California Act
requires the seller to disclose any defects or other facts not specifi-
cally called for, even if they are material to the purchaser's assess-
ment of the value or desirability of the property. However, the Dis-
closure Article makes clear that, "the specification of items for
disclosure in this article does not limit . . . any obligation for dis-
closure created by any other provision of law or which may exist in
order to avoid fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit in the transfer
transaction.2 11 In other words, while the new law mandates that
specific information on a prescribed written form must be actually
delivered to the prospective purchaser, it does not by its more lim-
ited scope effect any limitation on the broader duty to disclose "all
facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property"
recognized by the Easton opinion. 12
The Broker Duty Article also more specifically addresses the dis-
closure obligations of licensed real estate brokers who list property
for sale (the "listing broker") or who act in cooperation with listing
206. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text (discussing statutes).
207. The California Association of Realtors has prepared a form of Real Estate Transfer Dis-
closure Statement that it represents to be and is in compliance with § 1102.6. That statement is
attached as an Appendix to this article.
208. In the case of an ordinary sale, the statement must be delivered "as soon as practicable
before transfer of title." CAL. CIv. CODE § 1102.2(a) (West Supp. 1994). In the case of a transfer
by a sales contract or by a lease with an option to purchase or by a ground lease coupled with
improvements, the statement must be delivered "as soon as practicable before execution of the
contract," that is, before the making or accepting of an offer. Id. § 1102.2(b).
209. Id. §§ 1102.2, 1102.6, 1102.12.
210. Id. § 1102.6.
211. Id. § 1102.8 (emphasis added).
212. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (duscussing duty to disclose imposed by
Easton).
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brokers by finding a buyer (the "selling broker"). a3 It creates a
duty on brokers, "to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent
visual inspection of the property offered for sale and to disclose to
that prospective purchaser all facts materially affecting the value or
desirability of the property that such an inspection would reveal."214
This disclosure is required to be made by the broker's completion of
the Agent's Inspection Disclosure, Section III of the disclosure
statement mandated by the Disclosure Article. (See Appendix). In
the event the licensed agent is unable to obtain the required written
disclosure document and does not have written assurance from the
transferee that it has been received, the broker must advise the
transferee in writing of his or her rights to the disclosure. 15
After defining the affirmative disclosure duties of brokers partici-
pating in a regulated sale, the California legislature, presumably in
response to the uncertainties sounded by representatives of the real
estate brokerage industry, added certain clarifying provisions to the
statute.21 " For example, Broker Duty Article Section 2079.2 ex-
plains that the standard of care owed by any broker subject to Sec-
tion 2079's inspection and disclosure requirements is "the degree of
care that a reasonably prudent real estate licensee would exercise
and is measured by the degree of knowledge through education, ex-
perience, and examination, required to obtain a license. ' " In pass-
ing over the reasonably prudent person standard, applicable to most
common law tort claims including misrepresentation, in favor of
this higher reasonably prudent licensed, educated, experienced, and
examined real estate broker standard, the California legislature
adopted the philosophy seemingly underlying the Easton decision. 9
That philosophy holds that a broker who holds himself out to pro-
spective purchasers and to the public as an experienced, licensed
professional in the field of residential real property transactions, and
who financially benefits as a result of so doing, should be held to a
213. See supra note 202 and accompanying text (explaining that section 1102 extends section
2079 broker's duties to leases and sales contracts).
214. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2079 (West Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
215. Id. § 1102.12(b).
216. Compare the statutory language with the judicial language quoted in the text accompany-
ing supra notes 183 and 214. See also the discussion of the addition of the word "visual" in the
text accompanying infra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
217. CAL. Civ. CODE § 2079.2 (West Supp. 1994).
218. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(i) (1989).
219. Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 388-92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
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standard of care consistent with that position."' ° While this stricter
standard varies from that normally applied under ordinary negli-
gence law,22 ' it is well established in the analogous area of the fed-
eral regulation of sales of securities. There, the public investor (like
the home buyer) is less able than the broker to obtain the relevant
information about the proposed investment, and as a practical mat-
ter, he is forced to rely on the selling broker.2
The Broker Duty Article contains further clarification of a listing
or selling broker's duties of inspection and disclosure.22 As noted
above, the Broker Duty Article imposes upon brokers the duty to
conduct only a visual inspection, rather than the complete inspection
that the Easton court may well have intended. 2 4 The Article fur-
ther circumscribes the broker's duty of inspection by providing that
the inspection "does not include or involve an inspection of areas
that are reasonably and normally inaccessible .... -225 Although
one of the purposes of these limitations on the broadly articulated
broker duty of inspection in Easton may well have been to replace
uncertainty with objectivity, another purpose may have been to
place limits on the potential liability of real estate brokers to pur-
chasers. 26 If such a limitation were intended, any determination of
whether or to what extent it was achieved depends in part upon the
extent of the express statutory remedies as well as the preemptive
effect, if any, of the California Act (and particularly of the Broker
Duty Article) on the relevant common law as expanded by Easton.
The Disclosure Article offers no rescissionary remedy once the
transaction has been completed;2 27 it does allow a purchaser to re-
220. See Culum, supra note 118, at 342 (arguing that since buyers perceive brokers as profes-
sionals, brokers must be held to a professional standard of care in inspection and disclosing).
221. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (noting the applicability of the reasonably
prudent person standard in common law tort theories).
222. See, e.g.. Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 681-82, 696-97 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (finding that the average prudent investor would have relied on misstatements made by the
issuer of debentures).
223. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2079.3 (West Supp. 1994).
224. Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 386 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (suggesting that the
visual red flags of the soil erosion problem should have caused the broker to investigate the matter
further); see supra note 217 and accompanying text (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 2079.2 (West
Supp. 1994)).
225. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2079.3 (West Supp. 1994).
226. Easton, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386 (discussing the requirements of the Broker Duty Article).
227. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1102.13 (West Supp. 1994). Where, however, the disclosure document
is made available in an untimely manner but prior to the transfer of the property, the transferee
does have a period of three days (five if delivery was by mail) to terminate the agreement to
transfer the property. Id. § 1102.2(b).
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cover his or her actual damages suffered as a result of any person's
willful or negligent failure to comply with any of the statute's re-
quirements.22  As against the seller then, who as noted above is re-
quired to disclose only in response to the form's enumerated list of
questions, a purchaser may recover damages under the statute only
if the seller willfully or negligently failed to deliver the disclosure
statement, failed to answer any of the enumerated questions, or
falsely answered one or more of those questions.2 2' As mentioned
above, this remedy is in addition to, and in no way replaces or lim-
its, any common law remedy, whether or not grounded in Easton,
that may be available to a damaged purchaser.2 30 As against bro-
kers, a purchaser may recover damages under the Disclosure Article
if the broker willfully or negligently failed to adequately complete
the visual inspection of the premises or failed to make complete dis-
closure of material facts discoverable from the inspection required
in the Broker Duty Article.23 1
The Disclosure Article makes clear that, irrespective of whether
the defendant is a seller or a broker, there is no liability for any
false or omitted information unless it was within the actual knowl-
edge of the defendant or, in the case of information supplied by a
public agency or a recognized expert,23 2 unless he or she failed to
exercise ordinary care in obtaining and transmitting it.23 No seller
or broker can be found liable for an innocent misstatement or omis-
sion; he or she must be found guilty of no less than negligence in
fulfilling the duties of investigation and disclosure as described in
the statute. Consistent with the common law, if the seller or broker
exercised due diligence by meeting the required standard of care, no
liability will attach. 2 4 The affirmative defense of due diligence is
reinforced by Section 2079.5, which makes it clear that a buyer
must exercise reasonable care to protect himself and cannot recover
228. Id. § 1102.13.
229. See Appendix; see also text accompanying supra notes 206-09 (discussing the filing of the
disclosure statement by the seller).
. 230. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1102.8 (West Supp. 1994); see supra note 227-29 and accompanying
text (discussing the common law remedies which may be available to the purchaser despite the
filing of the disclosure statement).
231. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1102-1102.15, 2079-2079.10 (West Supp. 1994).
232. Section 1102.4 allows reasonable reliance on such experts as licensed engineers, land sur-
veyors, geologists, structural pest control operators, contractors and others. Id. § 1102.4.
233. Id.
234. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (discussing the legislature's adoption of the
reasonably prudent person standard).
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from a broker who fails to point out a defect or other adverse fact
that should have been discovered by a reasonably attentive and ob-
servant buyer.235 Indeed, further reinforcement can be inferred from
the statutorily required suggestion in Section V of the mandated dis-
closure statement that buyers and sellers should consider having the
property professionally inspected.286 (See Appendix). The statutorily
available due diligence defense and its recognition of the corre-
sponding purchaser duty of exercising ordinary care is consistent
with the common law, even as expanded by Easton.
B. The Maine Administrative Approach
Several years after the adoption of the California Act, the
problem of real property condition disclosure was addressed in the
State of Maine, somewhat indirectly, by the passage of the Real
Estate Brokerage License Act (the "Maine Act").2 7 The Maine
Act, which became effective January 1, 1988, regulates all real es-
tate brokerage transactions, essentially all sales of real property in
Maine that involve the services of a broker.2 3 8 Although the statute
contains no provisions relating to property condition disclosure, the
Maine Real Estate Commission has promulgated two disclosure
Rules that became effective February 1, 1988 (the "Maine
Rules").23 9 Since the Maine Commission has authority to regulate
only real estate brokerage, these provisions are not applicable to
sales by the owners of the offered properties.240 While the Maine
Rules do not provide any damage remedy for defrauded buyers,
they do establish the duty to disclose element necessary for a suc-
cessful action in common law fraud.2"
Section 11 of Chapter 330 of the Maine Rules states that "the
fiduciary duty of the licensee shall include the duty to disclose to the
client any information which is material to the sale of the real es-
tate.11 2 This section appears simply to reiterate that as a matter of
235. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079.5 (West Supp. 1994).
236. Id. § 1102.6.
237. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §6 13001-13251 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
238. The term "broker" or "real estate broker" is defined in § 13198.1 of the Maine Act as
"any person employed by or on behalf of an agency to perform brokerage and licensed by the
commission as a broker." Id. § 13198.1.
239. Id. § 13065.
240. Section 13002 of the Maine Act specifically excepts from real estate brokerage all transac-
tions conducted by any person who is the owner of the real estate. Id. § 13002.
241. Id. § 13067(D).
242. Code Me. R. ch. 330, § 11 (1992) (emphasis added). Chapter 330, entitled "Minimum
19951
DEPA UL LAW REVIEW
established agency law the licensee must disclose to the client, that
is, the seller or buyer, as the case may be, any information material
to the sale of which he or she has knowledge. 4 Section 14 of Chap-
ter 330, however, appears to impose, albeit more briefly, an Easton-
like duty by mandating that "[a] licensee shall disclose to a cus-
tomer any material defect of which he has knowledge, or acting in a
reasonable manner, he should have had knowledge, regarding the
condition of real estate. 2 4 That language clearly contemplates a
reasonable inspection and subsequent disclosure of any material de-
fects discoverable from that inspection, though not other material
information. This analysis is supported by the addition, effective Oc-
tober 1, 1991, of Maine Rules Chapter 330, Sections 6-7 and 16-19.
Much like the Disclosure Article of the California Act, these rules
require that a written disclosure statement be prepared and deliv-
ered by the appropriate licensees, and that it contain certain speci-
fied detailed information relating to the property's private water
supply, insulation, waste disposal system, and any known hazardous
materials. 4 5
C. The First Five Followers
During the spring and summer of 1992, seven and four years fol-
lowing the adoption of the California Act and the Maine Rules, re-
spectively, the legislatures of Virginia, Wisconsin, Kentucky, New
Hampshire and Alaska adopted a form of mandatory property con-
dition disclosure. These states' disclosure requirements warrant sep-
arate consideration.
a. Virginia
First in time, on March 7, 1992, the Virginia General Assembly
unanimously approved the bill sponsored by the Virginia Association
of Realtors as the Virginia Residential Property Disclosure Act (the
"Virginia Act"). 46 It became effective July 1, 1993.47
Standards of Practice," clarifies and establishes standards for practicing real estate brokerage. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. § 14 (emphasis added).
245. See id. §§ 6-7 (detailing the allocation of disclosure responsibilities among the listing bro-
ker, a selling broker and a licensee representing the buyer); id. §§ 16-19 (outlining the specific
information required to be provided in the disclosure statement). For a discussion of the California
Disclosure Act, see supra notes 206-12.
246. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-517-55-525 (Michie Supp. 1994).
247. Id.
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The Virginia Act is a very narrow version of the Disclosure Arti-
cle of the California Act. Like the Disclosure Article, the Virginia
Act applies to all sales and related transfers for value of residential
real property of four or fewer units whether or not a real estate
broker is involved. 48 Unlike the California Act, however, first sales
are excluded.2 49 The burden of timely providing a disclosure state-
ment to a prospective purchaser falls solely on the owner.2 50 That
duty is moderated by a statutory provision allowing the owner 'to
satisfy the statute by providing a disclaimer in lieu of the mandated
disclosure statement.2 5  Either statement is required to be in the
form developed by the state's real estate board. 52 In the case of the
disclaimer statement, the form must state that the owner makes no
representations or warranties about the condition of the property
and that the purchaser will be receiving the property "as is" with all
defects that may exist, except as otherwise provided in the contract
of sale. 53 In Virginia then, a seller of residential real estate may
exercise an option to sell under the traditional doctrine of caveat
emptor, provided that the buyer, after receiving the disclaimer
statement, agrees to complete the sale. 4
In the case of the disclosure statement, the statute calls upon the
Virginia Real Estate Board to implement the statutory provisions by
listing items
relative to the physical condition of the property . .. [which] may include
defects of which the owner has actual knowledge regarding: (i) the water
and sewage systems . . . (ii) insulation; (iii) structural systems . . . (iv)
plumbing, electrical, heating and air conditioning systems; (v) wood-destroy-
ing insect infestation; (vi) land use matters; (vii) hazardous or regulated
materials, including asbestos, lead-based paint, radon and underground stor-
age tanks; and (viii) other material defects known to the owner."55
In addition to including the above-listed items, much akin to the
248. Id. §§ 55-517, 55-518; see supra note 202 (quoting section 1102 of the California Disclos-
ure Act stating that the act applies to all sales and related transfers); see also supra note 203
(discussing section 1102.1 of the California Disclosure Act which exempts certain transfers that
are unlike voluntary sales because they are not for value).
249. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-518(9) (Michie Supp. 1994).
250. Id. § 55-519(1).
251. Id. § 55-519(2).
252. Id.
253. Id. § 55-519.1.
254. See supra notes 169-81 and accompanying text (discussing the role of caveat emptor in
real estate transactions).
255. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-519.2 (Michie Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
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California Act's specified items,2 56 the statute requires that the dis-
closure form notify owners and prospective purchasers that they
may wish to obtain a professional inspection and that the informa-
tion provided "is the representation of the owner and is not the rep-
resentation of the broker or salesperson. "257 In Virginia then, a pro-
spective purchaser is entitled to receive either: (1) a disclaimer
statement containing no information and a reminder that he or she
takes the property "as is" with no recourse for nondisclosure; or (2)
at best any information that the owner is aware of without being
required "to undertake or provide any independent investigation or
inspection of the property." 5 8
The Virginia Act allows a prospective purchaser to timely rescind
a contract of sale for any failure of the owner to comply with its
provisions.2 59 If the conveyance has already taken place, the pur-
chaser may recover any actual damages attributable to the owner's
misrepresentation or nondisclosure of a defect of which he or she
had knowledge, provided that an action is commenced within one
year from the date of settlement. " Of some comfort to a defrauded
purchaser is the Virginia Act's assurance that its limited express
remedy in no way "prevent[s] a purchaser from pursuing any reme-
dies at law or equity otherwise available against an owner in the
event of an owner's intentional or willful misrepresentation of the
condition of the subject property." 6 1
The Virginia Act has no equivalent to the Broker Duty Article of
the California Act or the comparable Maine Rules. 6 Section 55-
523 of the Virginia Act requires only that any listing or selling bro-
ker inform the owner and any purchaser of their statutory rights
and obligations as described above.2 63 Licensees have no other duties
and they are expressly excluded from any liability for any failure to
disclose information regarding real property covered by the stat-
256. See supra notes 206-12 and accompanying text (discussing the California Act's disclosure
requirements).
257. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-519.2 (Michie Supp. 1994).
258. Id. §§ 55-519.1-55-519.2.
259. Id. §§ 55-524.B.2. (referring also to section 55-520.B).
260. Id. § 55-524.B.1, § 5524.C.
261. Id. § 55-524.C; see supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text (discussing the possible
common law remedies).
262. See supra notes 213-26 (discussing the California Act Broker Duty Article); see also
supra notes 242-44 (discussing the Maine Act Broker Duty Article).
263. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-523 (Michie Supp. 1994).
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ute.2 "1 The primary purpose of the Virginia Act was apparently to
stave off the possibility that the Virginia courts would follow Easton
by imposing a duty to inspect and disclose on the state's real estate
brokers. That purpose has been achieved.
b. Wisconsin
On March 10, 1992, the Wisconsin General Assembly approved a
property condition disclosure bill that was proposed by that state's
realtors association.2 8 That statute, entitled "Disclosures by Owners
of Residential Real Estate" (the "Wisconsin Act"), 6 is an even
narrower version of the Disclosure Article of the California Act.
Like the Virginia Act, it applies to all sales for value of properties of
four or fewer units except those not yet occupied. 67 The Wisconsin
Act mandates that the owner of a property offered for sale must
timely deliver to any prospective buyer a completed copy of a re-
port, in the form specifically prescribed by the statute,26 8 disclosing
whether the owner is or is not aware of the presence of each of
twenty-eight enumerated defects in the water, insulation, electrical,
plumbing, and other systems in the home, or dangerous substances,
infestations, and the like.269 The form defines "am aware" as having
notice or knowledge. 270 The Wisconsin Act mandates the form of
disclosure statement not yet developed under the Virginia Act, but
they both cover essentially the same categories of items.27 1 Like the
Virginia disclosure statement, it includes language that the report is
not a warranty by the owner or any agent and suggests that an
owner or buyer might consider obtaining an independent inspec-
tion. 72 Unlike the Virginia Act, in Wisconsin an owner does not
have the option of delivering a disclaimer statement in lieu of the
264. Id.
265. See supra note 192 (citing the National Association of Realtors' Property Condition Dis-
closure policy).
266. WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 709.01-709.08 (West Supp. 1994).
267. Id. § 709.01; see supra note 202 (quoting section 1102 of the California Disclosure Act
holding that the Act applies to all varieties of sales); see also supra note 203 (discussing section
1102.1 of the California Act which exempts certain transfers that are unlike voluntary sales be-
cause they are not for value).
268. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 709.02 (West Supp. 1994).
269. Id. § 709.03.
270. Id.
271. Id.; see supra note 255 and accompanying text (quoting the statutory language that in-
structs the Virginia Real Estate Board to implement a disclosure form which complies with the
statutory requirements).
272. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 709.02 (West Supp. 1994).
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required disclosure report.27  The Wisconsin Act, however, does al-
low a buyer to waive in writing her right to receive the disclosure
report, and to waive her right to rescind the contract after receiving
an incomplete or inaccurate report.2 7 With respect to other re-
course against an owner or agent, the statute provides that "[tihe
right to rescind . . . is the only remedy under this chapter. 27 5 Pre-
sumably the "under this chapter" language leaves intact the pur-
chaser's damage remedies for intentional or negligent misrepresen-
tation or fraudulent concealment, at least to the extent they are
available under the common law of Wisconsin. 6
Like the Virginia Act, the Wisconsin Act contains no equivalent
of the California Act's Broker Duty Article. 7 Indeed, it imposes no
duties of any kind on the broker, not even the limited duty found in
the Virginia Act to inform the parties of the disclosure report obli-
gation.278 Apparently the legislature of Wisconsin also decided to
make more difficult an Easton-like expansion of the common law to
impose on brokers or sellers any duty to inspect the property and
disclose the fruits of that inspection for the benefit of the prospective
purchaser. Again, that purpose has been achieved.
c. Kentucky
The third of this second group of states to require property condi-
tion disclosure was Kentucky, where the General Assembly enacted
a new act relating to real estate brokers and salesmen that became
effective July 14, 1992 (the "Kentucky Act").27 9 The Kentucky Act
is most similar to the regulatory scheme of Maine, in that the
seller's completion and timely delivery to the prospective purchaser
of the required disclosure form is the responsibility of the broker
who anticipates being compensated for the sale.28 0 Like the Maine
273. See supra note 251 and accompanying text (discussing the Virginia Act's disclaimer
option).
274. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 709.08 (West Supp. 1994).
275. Id. § 709.05.
276. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text (discussing those causes of actions as they
have evolved).
277. See supra notes 262-64 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia's lack of a broker
duty article).
278. See supra note 263 (discussing Virginia's limited duty to inform the parties of the obliga-
tion to file a disclosure report).
279. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 324.360 (Michie Supp. 1994).
280. Id. § 324.360(5); see supra note 245 and accompanying text (discussing the Maine re-
quirement that the broker provide the seller with the disclosure form in a timely manner).
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scheme, it applies to all sales of all residential real estate except for
sales of new homes if a warranty is offered, but only if a licensed
broker is involved.2 81 The statute directed the Kentucky Real Estate
Commission to authorize a "seller's disclosure of conditions form,"
providing for disclosure of: the basement condition and whether it
leaks; the roof condition and whether it leaks; the source and condi-
tion of the water supply; the source and condition of sewage service;
the working condition of component systems; and such other matters
as the Kentucky Commission deems appropriate. 82 An unusual as-
pect of the Kentucky Act is the imposition on the broker of the duty
to inform the prospective purchaser without unreasonable delay the
seller refuses to complete and sign the disclosure form. 83
Since the Kentucky Act regulates only the broker, a purchaser
has no statutory recourse against the seller for damages as a result
of an undisclosed or inaccurately disclosed defect in the disclosure
of conditions form. 84 Of course, if the seller refuses to complete the
form and the prospective purchaser is so advised by the broker, he
can decline to enter into the contract of sale. The broker can, how-
ever, be found liable under the Kentucky Act for violating any duty
as set forth above or for "[m]aking any substantial misrepresenta-
tion or failing to disclose known defects which substantially affect
the value of the property."' 86 Since the penalties for such liability
are limited to suspension, license revocation, and fines, the available
disciplinary action is not useful to a damaged purchaser, at least
directly. Indirectly, however, such a finding of liability by the Ken-
tucky Commission should ensure the purchaser's recovery of dam-
ages from that broker for intentional misrepresentation or conceal-
ment of a known defect under established common law. 88
Unlike the Broker Duty Article of the California Act or Section
14 of the Maine Rules, both of which impose a duty to inspect and
disclose on the broker (and others in the case of the California Act),
the Kentucky Act fails to impose any Easton-like duty on the bro-
kers of that state. Again, the primary effect of the legislation ap-
281. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 324.360(1), § 324.360(4) (Michie Supp. 1994); see supra note
238 and accompanying text (discussing the Maine Act's applicability).
282. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 324.360(3)(a)-(f) (Michie Supp. 1994).
283. Id. § 324.360(6).
284. Id. § 324.160(1)(a).
285. Id. § 324.160(1)(b).
286. See supra text accompanying notes 117-60 (discussing broker liability for intentional mis-
representation or concealment of a known defect under common law).
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pears to be to deter the state courts from expanding the common
law obligations of brokers to prospective purchasers of real property.
d. New Hampshire
The fourth state to mandate the delivery of some property condi-
tion disclosure to prospective purchasers in 1992 was New Hamp-
shire, where administrative rules became effective on June 1, 1992
(the "New Hampshire Rules") . 87 These rules apply to all sales of
residential properties of four or fewer units where a licensee is in-
volved. 88 They require the listing broker to ask the seller for speci-
fied information about any private water supply, the insulation, and
any private sewage system, and to disclose the information obtained
to all prospective purchasers in writing. 89 In addition, the New
Hampshire Rules require the licensee to disclose to a prospective
buyer "any material defect of which he has knowledge regarding the
condition of real estate. 29 0 Once again, the duty imposed falls far
short of an obligation to complete a diligent inspection of the prem-
ises and to disclose all of the material information reasonably dis-
coverable from such an inspection, as required by the California
Act.
Later in 1992 the New Hampshire legislature approved a bill re-
quiring the seller of any real property that includes a building to
disclose to the prospective buyer the same specified information
called for from the broker under the New Hampshire Rules, to the
extent he or she knows such information (the "New Hampshire
Act"). 91 The required disclosure under the New Hampshire Act
applies only to information concerning the water supply and sewage
disposal system. 92 If the required information is unknown to the
seller, that fact must be stated to the buyer in writing. 29" This lim-
ited version of the New Hampshire Rules fails to impose on sellers
the obligation required of brokers that they disclose "any material
defect . . . regarding the condition of the real estate. ' 294 The Act
287. N.H. CODE ADMIN. R., Rca 701.04-.07 (1992).
288. Id.
289. Id. §§ 701.05,07.
290. Id. § 701.04.
291. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:4-c (Supp. 1993).
292. Id.
293. Id. § 477:4-c(II).
294. N.H. CODE ADMIN. R., Rea § 701.04 (1992); see also supra note 290 and accompanying
text.
[Vol. 44:381
1995] REAL ESTATE DISCLOSURE LEGISLATION 423
also fails to provide any express remedy, although its mandate
would satisfy the duty to disclose element required for a defrauded
buyer to recover damages for intentional misrepresentation under
state common law. The New Hampshire Act is applicable to a seller
of real estate whether or not a licensed real estate broker is partici-
pating in the sale, but it is nevertheless a very narrow version of the
Disclosure Article of the California Act.
e. Alaska
On July 14, 1992, Alaska became the last of this group of five
states to enact a version of the California Act's Disclosure Arti-
cle. 5 Like its four predecessors, the Alaska Act mandates that the
seller complete and deliver to any prospective purchaser a disclosure
statement in the form to be established by the state's real estate
commission. 96 Unlike those described above, however, the Alaska
Act provides no guidance concerning, among other things, the cate-
gories of information to be disclosed.297 It is also unique in that it
applies only to single-family dwellings and two dwellings in one
building." 8 Like most of the legislation enacted in 1992-93, it is not
applicable to the first sale of property which has never been
occupied. 9
In addition to the usual limited right of rescission,"'0 the Alaska
Act also provides the buyer with an express remedy for actual dam-
ages suffered as a result of even a negligent violation of the statute
or failure to perform a required duty.80 1 If the violation or failure
was willful, the purchaser may recover up to three times the actual
damages. 0 2 In either case, a court is authorized to award costs and
attorneys fees to the extent consistent with its rules.3 03 On the other
hand, the Alaska Act insulates the owner from any liability for any
defect or other condition that is disclosed. 304 It also allows the par-
ties to waive the applicability of the statute to the proposed sale by
295. ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.70.010-.70.200 (Supp. 1993).
296. Id. § 34.70.010.
297. Id. § 34.70.050.
298. Id. § 34.70.200(3).
299. Id. § 34.70.120.
300. See id. § 34.70.020 (providing that the buyer may rescind an offer to purchase property
after the seller's disclosure by written notice within the specified period of time).
301. Id. § 34.70.090(b).
302. Id. § 34.70.090(c)
303. Id. § 34.70.090.
304. Id. § 34.70.030.
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written agreement and it has no effect on any "other obligations for
disclosure required by law."'3 05 The Alaska Act also contains no
equivalent of the California Act's Broker Duty Article; indeed, it is
altogether silent on the issue of broker responsibilities.
D. The Later Ten Disclosure Acts
During their 1992-93 legislative sessions, and generally under the
sponsorship and with the support of the state association of real-
tors,80 6 the ten states of Delaware, 07 Illinois, 0 8 Indiana, 0 9 Iowa,310
Maryland,31' Michigan," 2 Mississippi,3 13  Ohio314 Rhode Island815
and South Dakota 16 each enacted a limited version of the Disclos-
ure Article of the California Act (the "Later Ten Acts"). Like the
California Act and most of its earlier progeny, these statutes gener-
ally apply to all transfers for value of residential real property con-
taining four or fewer dwelling units.317 Unlike the California Act,
however, but like most of its progeny, all of the Later Ten Acts,
except those of Delaware, Iowa and Mississippi, exempt from their
coverage sales of new or never-occupied residences. 18 Finally, like
the regulatory schemes of Maine" ' and Kentucky,320 the Mississippi
305. Id. § 34.70.110 (allowing the parties to waive the applicability of the statute to the pro-
posed sale by written agreement); id. § 34.70.070 (limiting the applicability of the waiver).
306. See supra note 192 (citing the National Association of Realtors' Property Condition Dis-
closure statement); see also James D. Lawlor, Seller Beware: Burden of Disclosing Defects Shift-
ing to Sellers, 78 A.B.A. J. 90 (Aug. 1992) (noting the legislative push by state real estate broker
associations and the National Association of Realtors for mandatory seller disclosure programs).
307. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2570-2578 (1993).
308. SHA. 765 ILCS 77-77/99 (Supp. 1994).
309. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-4.6-2 - 24-4.6-2-13 (West 1994).
310. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 558A.1-558A.8 (1992 & Supp. 1994).
311. MD. CODE ANN.. REAL PROP. § 10-702 (Supp. 1993).
312. MICH. STAT. ANN. 9 26.1286(51)-(66) (Callaghan Supp. 1993).
313. Miss. CODE. ANN. 99 89-1-501 -89-1-523 (Supp. 1993).
314. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30 (Anderson Supp. 1993).
315. R.I. GEN. LAWS. §§ 5-20.8-1 - 5-20.8-10 (Supp. 1993).
316. S.D, CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 43-4-37 -43-4-44 (Supp. 1994).
317. Note, however, that the Ohio Act is applicable to all residential property regardless of the
number of units. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30(B)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1993); see supra note
202 (quoting § 1102 of the California Act holding that the Act applies to all sales and transfers);
see also supra note 203 (exempting sales not made for value).
318. SH.A. 765 ILCS 77/15(9) (Supp. 1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4-6.2-1(b)(8) (West
1994); MD CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-702(A)(1) (Supp. 1993); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1286
(53)(i) (Callaghan Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5302.30(B)(2)(e) (Anderson Supp.
1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-20.8-3(8) (Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-4-43(6) (Supp.
1994).
319. See supra notes 237-45 and accompanying text (discussing Maine scheme).
320. See supra notes 279-86 and accompanying text (discussing Kentucky scheme).
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disclosure act applies only to sales involving a licensed real estate
broker.32 -
Each of the Later Ten Acts contains a somewhat different combi-
nation of the disclosure provisions of the California Act and the
First Five Followers. However, they all mandate that the seller dis-
close some amount of property condition or defect information of
which he or she has actual knowledge, and in Iowa, the seller must
disclose information which is available upon reasonable effort.322
With the exception of the Iowa act, there is no duty on the disclos-
ing seller to make any inspection whatever as a basis for his or her
completion of the required disclosure document.32 s
The statutes of Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi and South Dakota
follow the California and Wisconsin approach by prescribing the ac-
tual text of the disclosure document required to be prepared and
delivered to the prospective purchaser. 2 ' The categories of informa-
tion called for by the Michigan,32 5 Mississippi,3 2" and South Da-
kota 2  acts are much like those required by the California Act's
mandated form of disclosure (attached as an Appendix to this arti-
cle) in both their considerable scope and detail. The form prescribed
by the Illinois statute is modeled after that contained in the Wiscon-
sin Act. 8 It simply calls for the seller to indicate whether or not
she is aware of twenty-two enumerated structural defects and other
potentially dangerous conditions. 29
The remaining six of the Later Ten Acts, like the above-described
Virginia and Kentucky Acts, call for the adoption of a property con-
dition disclosure form by the state real estate commission or other
agency having jurisdiction. With the exception of the Delaware stat-
ute, which like the Alaska Act leaves the content of the disclosure
form entirely within the discretion of the appropriate regulatory
body,33 0 they each direct their respective regulatory body to include
at least certain specified information. The amount of mandated in-
formation varies widely, from the Indiana act's limited list of the
321. MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-1-501(1) (Supp. 1993).
322. IOWA CODE ANN. § 558A.3(1) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
323. Id. §§ 558A.1-558A.8.
324. See Appendix.
325. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1286(57) (Callaghan Supp. 1993).
326. Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-1-509 (Supp. 1993).
327. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-4-44 (Supp. 1994).
328. See supra notes 268-71 and accompanying text (discussing the Wisconsin Act).
329. See S.H.A. 765 ILCS 77/35 (Supp. 1994).
330. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 6, § 2578 (1993).
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foundation, the mechanical systems, the roof, the structure and the
water and sewage systems, 88' to the Rhode Island act's more
lengthy list of thirty-four enumerated items.33 2 In every case the
regulatory body has authority to include any "[o]ther areas that
[it] determines are appropriate."as' The Maryland statute of-
fers sellers the option to deliver a residential property disclaimer
statement similar in content and effect to that contained as an op-
tion for sellers under the Virginia Act. 884
As emphasized above, neither the California Act nor any of its
five earlier progeny require the seller of residential real property to
make any disclosure of material information not specifically called
for by the applicable disclosure document. However, disclosure to
prospective buyers of all known or reasonably discoverable material
information is required of sellers and brokers by the Easton deci-
sion,33 5 and of brokers by the Broker Duty Article of the California
Act.336 Furthermore, disclosure of all known "material defects"
(though not other material information) is required of brokers by
the Maine and New Hampshire Rules. 37 It is therefore noteworthy
that three of the Later Ten Acts, those of Delaware, 8 O Maryland,3 9
and Rhode Island, 840 also impose upon sellers this more open-ended
duty to disclose any other known material defects, in addition to the
items specifically enumerated in the statute. While these three acts
facially go further than the Disclosure Article of the California Act,
the common law in most jurisdictions already prohibits the fraudu-
lent concealment of known defects and increasingly requires disclos-
ure of those defects that are reasonably ascertainable by sellers of
real property and participating brokers.3 4'
In general, the Later Ten Acts, like the earlier five followers of
California, allow a prospective purchaser to timely rescind a con-
331. IND. CODE ANN. §24-4-4.6-2-7(1) (West 1994).
332. RI. GEN. LAWS § 5-20.8-2(b) (Supp. 1993).
333. IND. CODE ANN. §24-4-4.6-2-7(1) (West 1994).
334. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-702(B) and (C) (Supp. 1993); see supra note 254
(discussing Virginia Act's sellers' option).
335. Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
336. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 2079-2079.10 (West Supp. 1994).
337. See supra notes 242, 290 and accompanying text (discussing disclosure requirements in
Maine and New Hampshire).
338. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2572(a) (1993).
339. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-702(d)(2)(viii) (Supp. 1993).
340. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-20.8-2(a) (Supp. 1992).
341. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text (discussing common law disclosure
requirements).
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tract of sale and, following completion of the transaction, to recover
at least actual damages resulting from a violation of the statute's
disclosure or other obligations. 42 While the specific remedies vary,
none of the statutory remedies is expressly preemptive of any com-
mon law cause of action for fraud. As noted above, none of the
Later Ten Acts, other than the Iowa act, imposes liability for any
omission or misrepresentation in the absence of actual knowledge.
Even under the Iowa act, a defrauded purchaser cannot recover
where the seller exercised ordinary care in obtaining the required
information ."
The Later Ten Acts are essentially variations of only the Disclos-
ure Article of the California Act. They are designed to provide pro-
spective purchasers of real estate with written disclosure of certain
property condition information from the sellers. None of these stat-
utes contains any equivalent of the California Act's Broker Duty
Article. Accordingly, each and every statute represents the results of
an apparent concerted effort by members of the real estate industry
to contain Easton as it relates to broker duties of inspection and
disclosure within the boundaries of California.344
E. The Remaining Thirty-Three States
There are presently thirty-three states which do no require the
disclosure of any property condition or other material information to
prospective purchasers of residential real property by sellers or par-
ticipating brokers (the "Remaining Thirty-Three"). 45 Of those,
twenty-eight have voluntary disclosure programs presently in place
that are likely, given the continuing concerted efforts of the Na-
tional Association of Realtors, to be enacted in a mandatory
form.3 46 The legislatures of each of the remaining five states, specifi-
cally Alabama, Florida, New Jersey, Kansas and Tennessee (the
"Unconvinced Five"), are apparently still comfortable with the reg-
342. But see R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-20.8-4 to 8-5 (Supp. 1992) (providing the buyer only with a
right of rescission and a civil penalty of $100 per occurrence in the case of any violation of that
act's provisions). Note also that section 55 of the Illinois Act, like that of Alaska, allows the court
to award reasonable attorneys' fees. S.H.A. 765 ILCS 77/55 (Supp. 1994).
343. IOWA CODE ANN. § 558A.6(l) (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
344. Lawlor, supra note 306, at 90.
345. See supra notes 190-344 and accompanying text (discussing the seventeen states which
adopted property disclosure laws).
346. See supra notes 190-344 and accompanying text (discussing the seventeen states which
adopted property disclosure laws).
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ulation of residential real property transactions primarily by its
form of ever-evolving common law fraud, including the well-estab-
lished but well-eroded doctrine of caveat emptor.
III. EFFECTS OF DISCLOSURE LEGISLATION ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW
Historically, the sale of residential real property, like the sale of
other real and personal property of all sorts, was regulated largely
by the common law torts of fraudulent concealment, intentional
misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation. The elements of
real estate fraud are a characteristic and strength of the common
law, and they have been from time to time adapted by the courts to
accommodate the realities of the marketplace. The culmination of
that development was the decision in Easton recognizing a duty on
the sellers of residential real property, and imposing the same duty
on any and all participating brokers, to inspect the offered real prop-
erty and to disclose not only any defects discoverable during that
inspection, but also "all facts materially affecting the value or desir-
ability of the property '3 47 to any and all prospective purchasers.
This expansion of real estate fraud to provide a common law dam-
age remedy for buyers in California would, in the normal course,
have been further refined by case law in that state. No doubt it
would also have been adopted by at least some other state courts
that have long regarded the California courts to be at the forefront
of tort law evolution. Instead, the major consequence of the Easton
decision was the enactment of the California Act and its progeny.
The impact of that legislation on the scope and direction of the law
of real estate fraud has been and continues to be enormous. Essen-
tially, the evolving Easton approach, even to the extent preserved in
the California codification, now stands dead in its tracks.
A. The Effect of the California Act
The California Act largely codified and thereby ratified the ex-
panded duties owed by the sellers and brokers of residential real
property. 4 8 The Disclosure Article goes further than the judicially-
created law by affirmatively requiring the preparation and delivery
347. See supra text accompanying note 183 (quoting Easton 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390).
348. See supra notes 206-12 and accompanying text (discussing the California disclosure
article).
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of a disclosure statement containing prescribed detailed useful infor-
mation, and by providing a buyer with a remedy for any damages
caused by a violation of that requirement. 4 9 While the statutory
disclosure requirement clearly helps the buyer obtain at least some
useful information, and presumably makes him aware of the right to
obtain correct and complete information, it adds only modestly to
the broad protection available to the buyer since Easton.3 50 On the
other hand, the statutory remedy is consistent with that afforded by
the case law and, more importantly, it is in addition to the remedies
available by reliance on Easton3 5 1
The effect of the Broker Duty Article on common law real estate
fraud in California is less easily evaluated. The Broker Duty Article
clearly codified much of Easton's imposition of an affirmative duty
on brokers to visually inspect the offered premises and disclose all
material facts reasonably discoverable from that inspection to pro-
spective purchasers.3 5 In several respects, however, the statutory
duty is in several respects more limited than that imposed by the
Easton court.353
Similarly, the statutory remedy against the broker, while gener-
ally consistent with the case law in matters such as the due diligence
defense, is more limited. It must be commenced no later than "two
years from the date of possession, which means the date of recorda-
tion, the date of close of escrow, or the date of occupancy, which-
ever occurs first."3 54 The statute of limitations applicable to a com-
mon law fraud action against a broker who negligently
misrepresents or omits material facts under the Easton precedent
would be three years. More importantly, it would run from the ear-
lier of the date of the discovery of the actionable misstatement or
omission or the date on which it should reasonably have been
discovered."'
Unlike the Disclosure Article, there is no provision in the Broker
Duty Article stating that it is in addition to the broader duty and
349. See supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text (discussing the disclosure form require-
ment); see also and supra note 228 and accompanying text (discussing the remedy).
350. See supra notes 227-31 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory remedy in light
of the remedies available under Easton).
351. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1102.8 (West Supp. 1994).
352. See supra notes 206-10 and accompanying text (discussing the codification of Easton).
353. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between the
California legislation and the Easton decision).
354. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2079.4 (West Supp. 1994).
355. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 338 (West 1994).
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corresponding remedy afforded a prospective buyer by the Easton
opinion.8 56 Accordingly, it could be argued that the California legis-
lature was persuaded and that it intended to ratify only a portion of
Easton, thereby limiting the scope of the broker's duty of inspection
and disclosure to that expressly detailed in that Article. 85 7 Under
this analysis, one effect of the statute is to reduce the risk of liability
that existed after Easton of a broker who provides false or incom-
plete disclosure. As a practical matter, such an interpretation of the
statute would be to afford protection to the broker at the expense of
the buyer, and perhaps more importantly, at the expense of the
seller, to whom the buyer would be forced to look exclusively for his
or her remedy. Until the intent of the legislature is determined by
California courts faced with facts that would cause a broker to be
found liable under Easton but not under the statute, the effect of
the statute on the then-existing common law in this critical area of
broker liability is a continuing uncertainty.
B. The Effect of the Maine Approach
The provisions of Chapter 330 of the Maine Rules impose on all
real estate brokers duties similar to, but somewhat less broad than,
those imposed by the California Act's codification of Easton.3 58 Al-
though the Maine Rules also require an inspection of the premises
as explained above, they require the disclosure of only "material de-
fects"859 rather than of "all facts materially affecting the value or
desirability of that property" as required by the California Act.3 60
The Maine approach does not, however, provide equivalent benefit
to the purchaser of residential real estate, in that the Maine Rules
provide a misinformed or uninformed buyer with no express remedy
of any kind. 61 While the Maine Commission, either in response to a
purchaser complaint or on its own motion, may bring disciplinary
proceedings resulting in substantial monetary and other penalties to
a violating broker, that enforcement provides no relief to the pur-
chaser.3 6 Unless a Maine court were willing to imply a private right
356. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
357. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 2079-2079.9 (West Supp. 1994).
358. See supra notes 237-45 and accompanying text (discussing the Maine approach).
359. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (quoting the Maine Act).
360. See supra note 214 and accompanying text (quoting the California Act).
361. See supra note 241 and accompanying text (discussing the remedies available under the
Maine Act).
362. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 13066-13068 (West 1994).
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of action for a violation of Section 14 of the Maine Rules, an un-
likely possibility,"' the buyer is restricted to judicially developed
remedies, as discussed above.864
The Maine approach administratively regulates its real estate
brokerage industry.365 While this approach is very helpful by impos-
ing a duty on brokers to prospective purchasers of real property, its
impact on the development of real estate fraud in Maine is indirect.
Its more general impact is also limited since no other state that has
mandated property condition disclosure, with the partial exception
of New Hampshire,866 has selected an administrative rather than
the broader legislative approach. 67 Not even the two states that
regulate only those sales that involve a licensed broker, Kentucky 8
and Mississippi,6 9 have adopted the Maine approach.37 0
C. The Effect of the California Act's Progeny
As described above, since March 7, 1992, a total of fifteen state
legislatures have enacted statutes that, despite considerable varia-
tion in their provisions, can each be viewed as a narrow version of
the Disclosure Article of the California Act (the "Prevailing Dis-
closure Act"). 71 The Prevailing Disclosure Act mandates the prepa-
ration and delivery by the seller to any prospective purchaser of resi-
dential real estate of a disclosure document, or in the case of
Virginia and Maryland either a disclosure document or a disclaimer
statement. 72 The Prevailing Disclosure Act contains no equivalent
of the Broker Duty Article of the California Act. 73
The fifteen enactments of the Prevailing Disclosure Act during
363. See, e.g., Smith v. Rickard, 254 Cal. Rptr. 633, 636-39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that
real estate brokers in California for sellers have no duty to inspect and disclose to buyers facts
that affect the value of the property); Reeves v. Weber, 509 So. 2d 158, 160 (La. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that a purchaser's remedy against a real estate broker is limited to fraud); see supra note
244 and accompanying text (discussing section 14).
364. See supra notes 19-181 and accompanying text (discussing obligations under common
law); supra notes 241, 244 and accompanying text (discussing the Maine remedies).
365. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 13066-12068 (West 1994).
366. See supra notes 287-94 and accompanying text (discussing the New Hampshire Act).
367. See supra notes 237-45 and accompanying text (discussing the Maine approach).
368. See supra notes 279-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Kentucky approach).
369. See supra note 321 and accompanying text (discussing the Mississippi Act).
370. See supra notes 237-45 and accompanying text (discussing the Maine approach).
371. See supra notes 206-12 and accompanying text (discussing the California Act).
372. See supra notes 246-344 and accompanying text (discussing the Prevailing Disclosure
Act).
373. See supra notes 206-12 and accompanying text (discussing the California Act).
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1992-93 were, like that of the California Act, triggered by the Eas-
ton decision's substantial expansion of the disclosure obligations of
the seller of residential real estate and of participating brokers in
California."" However, the impact of these statutes on the common
law of their states is perhaps even more dramatic. As analyzed
above, the California Act simply put into statutory form the greater
part of the judicially-expanded obligations of sellers and brokers to
discover and disclose all material facts, albeit with some limiting
guidelines, especially with respect to broker responsibilities.3 75 Es-
sentially, it was too late in California after Easton for even the pow-
erful California Association of Realtors to convince the legislature
to roll back the characteristic judicial development in the area of
real estate fraud. Instead, the legislation effectively arrested that de-
velopment at Easton.
In most jurisdictions other than California, the early well-estab-
lished doctrine of caveat emptor remained substantially intact, pre-
cluding or at least slowing any judicial creation and expansion of
disclosure duties necessary to support a remedy for nondisclosure.3 76
In general, an uninformed, rather than misinformed, buyer's only
legal remedy lay in the doctrine of fraudulent concealment of a
known defect to the limited extent that it existed under the applica-
ble state law. 77 Accordingly, the enactment of the Prevailing Dis-
closure Act, usually proposed and sponsored by the state association
of realtors, mandated the disclosure and delivery by the seller of
information perhaps not yet required by the existing common law of
the state.37 8 It therefore eliminated for the foreseeable future any
judicial attempts to move in the direction of imposing any duty of
disclosure whatsoever on members of the real estate industry. To the
limited extent that a purchaser of real estate is benefitted by the
Prevailing Disclosure Act, all costs of that benefit fall on the indi-
vidual seller rather than on the real estate professional.
374. See supra notes 246-344 and accompanying text (discussing the fifteen statutes which
follow the California Act).
375. See supra notes 206-12 and accompanying text (discussing the California Act).
376. See supra notes 345-46 and accompanying text (discussing the thirty-three states which
have not enacted disclosure legislation).
377. See supra note 39 (providing'the elements for common law fraud).
378. Lawlor, supra note 306, at 90.
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IV. THE PRACTICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE PREVAILING
DISCLOSURE ACT
The enormous adverse impact of the Prevailing Disclosure Act on
the common law evolution of real estate fraud is of considerable,
albeit somewhat theoretical importance. It must be considered in
any useful evaluation of the desirability of the Act as an alternative
to the more comprehensive approach of the California Act or the
more traditional evolving common law approach of those states
without mandatory disclosure legislation. Even more important are
the ramifications of the Prevailing Disclosure Act on the particular
parties affected and on the health of the real estate sector of the
economy." 9 The usual impetus for the enactment of a comprehen-
sive statutory scheme is that a substantial segment of society is in
need of and worthy of legal protection where none exists under com-
mon law.
An obvious example of this was Congress' enactment of the fed-
eral securities laws in 1933-34 to protect investors from the securi-
ties fraud that was believed to have contributed to the Depression.38 0
Those statutes required all sellers of securities and all participating
brokers to disclose to prospective purchasers all reasonably discover-
able material information. 881 The stated purpose of that legislation
was to protect the investor.382
Another category of relevant statutes is that of the various con-
sumer protection acts, where again, the presumed purpose was to
afford legal recourse to inadequately protected consumers.38 3 In
those somewhat analogous areas, the lawmakers seem to have con-
cluded that the protection of the then inadequately protected inves-
379. See supra notes 246-344 and accompanying text (discussing the fifteen states which en-
acted the Prevailing Disclosure Act).
380. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988); Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-7811 (1988).
381. See 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1988) (requiring that securities brokers and dealers file a registra-
tion statement for securities which must contain a schedule of information, including the names
and addresses of underwriters and major financial statements of the issuing corporation); id. § 781
(containing similar disclosure requirements pertaining to the application for registration of the
security).
382. 48 Stat. 74, ch. 38 (1933) pmbl; see 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1988) (authorizing the Securities
and Exchange Commission to promulgate regulations requiring the registration statement for a
security to contain any information or documents necessary for the protection of investors).
383. See, e.g., Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, S.H.A. 815
ILCS 505-505/12 (1992); Minnesota Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 325D.43-325D.47 (West Supp. 1994); New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 56:8-1-56:8-48 (West 1988).
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tor or consumer was necessary and desirable, that the disclosure
form of regulation was effective, and that the costs of compliance
were not unreasonably burdensome to the sellers and their agents,
as compared to the resulting benefits for the protected class and the
marketplace generally.384
The Prevailing Disclosure Act has the appearance of being en-
acted in order to provide needed protection to the purchasers of resi-
dential real estate. Therefore, it too should be evaluated and mea-
sured against possible alternatives by balancing its benefits with its
costs to all concerned parties.
A. The Purchaser
As set forth above, the purchaser of residential real estate has a
common law remedy against the seller and participating brokers for
damages proximately caused by the misrepresentation or fraudulent
concealment of known material defects.3 85 Prior to the enactment of
the Prevailing Disclosure Act, neither sellers nor brokers in states
other than California,386 Maine, and New Hampshire38 7 had any
duty to make any disclosure unless they had knowledge of a mate-
rial defect. Furthermore, they had no duty to inspect or to take
other action to discover the existence of any material defects.3 88
The Prevailing Disclosure Act ensures389 that the buyer will be
presented with a disclosure statement form completed by the seller
containing certain specified information about the property to the
extent known to the seller.390 In addition, in Delaware, Maryland,
and Rhode Island, the purchaser will be advised of any material
defects. 91 Finally, the Prevailing Disclosure Act adds a specific
remedy for any violation of its requirements. 92 As emphasized
384. See supra notes 381-84 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC laws and several con-
sumer protection acts which support this conclusion).
385. See supra note 39 (stating the elements for common law fraud).
386. See supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text (discussing the California Act).
387. See supra notes 237-45, 287-94 and accompanying text (discussing disclosure require-
ments in Maine and New Hampshire).
388. See supra notes 40-166 and accompanying text (discussing the common law duties placed
on sellers and brokers).
389. But see supra notes 250, 334 and accompanying text (stating that in Maryland and Vir-
ginia disclaimer is permitted).
390. See supra notes 206-12 and accompanying text (discussing the California Act); see also
note 322 and accompanying text (explaining that in Iowa, the disclosure must contain material
information known or discoverable).
391. See supra notes 338-40 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text (discussing the remedies available under
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above, except for the physical delivery of a statement with some in-
formation, the statute adds nothing to the buyer's common law pro-
tection against the seller. It limits at the status quo her remedy
against the broker typically having the deeper pocket. 9 '
As a practical matter, the buyer must undertake the same inspec-
tion of the premises as was necessary in the absence of the Prevail-
ing Disclosure Act to protect against overpaying and to establish the
element of reasonable reliance for a possible fraud claim.'" 4 An un-
fortunate affect of the statute is that upon receiving a disclosure
document with a formal and legalistic appearance, the buyer may
assume that he or she is fully informed and forego such an
investigation.
Another cost to the buyer is the increase in price resulting from
the burdens of complying with the mandated disclosure require-
ments.3 95 A seller may reasonably believe that the complexities of
the new law preclude her selling the property without the services of
a broker, and will therefore increase the price to cover the broker's
commission. Ironically, however, the imposition of greater duties of
inspection and disclosure on the broker was short-circuited by the
passage of the Prevailing Disclosure Act, which at the same time
makes the broker more essential.
B. The Seller
The seller of residential real property must comply with the dis-
closure obligations of the Prevailing Disclosure Act, and risks liabil-
ity for failing to correctly and completely provide the information
called for by the statute.396 As a matter of substance, the seller's
burden is only marginally increased, since he or she is already obli-
gated under common law principles to disclose all known defects.897
In addition, the seller gains some benefit since he cannot be held
the Prevailing Disclosure Adt).
393. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text (discussing the common law remedies still
available under the statute).
394. See supra notes 167-81 and accompanying text (discussing the obligations placed on the
purchaser under common law).
395. See supra notes 167-81 and accompanying text (discussing the obligations placed on the
purchaser under common law).
396. See supra notes 246-344 and accompanying text (discussing the fifteen states that enacted
the Prevailing Disclosure Act).
397. See supra notes 40-80 and accompanying text (discussing the seller's common law duty to
disclose defects).
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liable for any damages caused by a disclosed defect or condition. 39 8
Practically, however, the seller is forced or believes he is forced to
engage a real estate broker in order to handle the required compli-
ance at a cost that the seller may not be able to fully pass on to the
buyer. The increased cost is at least a small burden on an individ-
ual's inherent right to acquire and sell real property, especially since
many sellers list with brokers in any event. Again ironically, while
the broker becomes almost indispensable as a result of the statutory
compliance obligations, that same statute not only fails to impose
any new duties of inspection or disclosure on the broker, but even
fails to acknowledge any duties arguably' still existing at common
law.89 9 Accordingly, the statutory limit on a broker's potential liabil-
ity to a defrauded purchaser has shifted the risk of any such liability
dramatically from the broker to the seller.
C. The Broker and the Brokerage Industry
As mentioned above, the National Association of Realtors has
been the primary impetus behind the passage of the Prevailing Dis-
closure Act.400 It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the benefits to
the broker and the brokerage industry are enormous. Simply put,
the statute enhances the dependence of a seller of residential real
estate on the services of a broker, effectively limits the broker's lia-
bility for nondisclosure to the purchaser, and prevents the imposition
of a duty on the broker to inspect and disclose to the purchaser the
discoverable fruits of that inspection."0 1 The imposition of such a
duty would likely have occurred through judicial development in the
absence of the statutes' enactment.0 2 The Prevailing Disclosure Act
provides some small added disclosure to the purchaser. '03 All of
398. See, e.g., supra note 229 and accompanying text (stating that purchasers may not recover
from sellers who have properly disclosed).
399. See supra note 17-181 and accompanying text (discussing judicially created disclosure
obligations).
400. Lawlor, supra note 306, at 90. Similarly, realtor associations promoted state enactment of
stigma statutes following the decision in Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
McEvoy, supra note 8, at 586-87.
401. See supra notes 246-344 and accompanying text (discussing the Prevailing Disclosure
Act).
402. Meyer, supra note 117, at 242, 271-72. Professor McEvoy concludes that the development
of disclosure obligations relative to psychological factors is best left to the courts, rather than the
legislature. McEvoy, supra note 8, at 588.
403. See supra notes 246-344 and accompanying text (discussing the Prevailing Disclosure
Act).
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these effects occur at the expense of the seller rather than the bro-
ker, without a single cost to the broker. It would be difficult to envi-
sion a statutory scheme better designed to further the special inter-
ests of the real estate brokerage industry.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE REMAINING THIRTY-THREE
STATES
A. Continued Development of Common Law Obligations
In light of the above analysis of the Prevailing Disclosure Act, the
legislatures of the Remaining Thirty-Three 04 should first give care-
ful consideration to the question whether there is any need for statu-
tory disclosure regulation of residential real estate transactions.
That decision requires a consideration of whether the applicable
common law regulating real estate fraud affords too little protection
to potential purchasers. States must also decide whether purchasers'
inability to adequately protect themselves warrants imposing addi-
tional burdens on the sellers of offered properties or on participating
brokers.If the answer is that the common law should be superseded by a
statutory scheme for the better protection of purchasers, and there-
fore a healthier real estate sector of the economy, the legislature
would be well-advised to consider the comprehensive approach of
the California Act.4 °5 Since the seller's common law disclosure obli-
gations are already very complete, 406 and arguably hover at the
point of unlawfully interfering with her inherent right to sell the
real property, any needed additional disclosure must be required
from the brokers participating in the sale. Obviously, that duty must
at a minimum include disclosing to prospective purchasers all infor-
mation available from the broker's reasonably diligent inspection of
the premises offered for sale. As the federal securities laws have il-
lustrated over the last sixty years, the sales professionals in the field
are the best source of complete and correct disclosure.401
404. See supra notes 345-46 and accompanying text (discussing the remaining thirty-three
states).
405. See supra notes 200-36 and accompanying text (discussing the California Act).
406. See supra notes 40-80 and accompanying text (discussing the seller's common law duty to
disclose defects).
407. See, e.g., E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Penham, 547 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Pachter v.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 444 F. Supp. 417 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Alton Box Board v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D. Mo. 1976), vacated, 560 F.2d 916 (8th Cir.
1977); Phillips v. Reynolds & Co., 294 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
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There is little doubt that the evolving common law of fraud has
been especially well-suited to the residential real estate market-
place. "0 8 Indeed, all of the statutes enacted to date have interfered
with the gradual but steady judicial expansion of those disclosure
duties owed to prospective purchasers by members of the brokerage
industry.40 9 Accordingly, the better approach for the Remaining
Thirty-Three may well be to let the common law move forward free
of statutory limitation or other interference, and to reject the self-
interested lobbying efforts of the National Association of Realtors
and its state affiliates.
A statutory disclosure scheme that fails to impose on brokers ap-
propriate responsibilities and consequential potential liability is the
worst of all presently available alternatives. No state should seri-
ously consider enacting the Prevailing Disclosure Act; those states
that have already done so would be well-advised either to finish the
job by enacting the California Broker Duty Article to complement
and balance its statutory scheme,41 0 or to restore the time-tested
common law regulation of real estate fraud by repealing its limiting
mandatory disclosure act."
B. Suggestions for Legislative Enactments
This article advocates continued development of the common law
as opposed to state legislation in the area of seller and broker dis-
closure. 1" If a state were to consider disclosure legislation, however,
the format of the Broker Duty Article of the California statute is
preferable over seller disclosure legislation. 1 Whichever form of
disclosure legislation a state chooses to consider, there are a number
of considerations which seem to have been ignored by the existing
legislation.414 State legislators should fully consider and debate
these issues in order to insure the fairest and most comprehensive
disclosure legislation.
408. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing common law fraud).
409. See supra notes 117-66 and accompanying text (discussing judicial trends in disclosure
duties owed by brokers).
410. See supra notes 213-36 and accompanying text (discussing the California Broker Duty
Article).
411. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing common law fraud).
412. See supra notes 407-11 and accompanying text (discussing this author's recommendations
for the remaining thirty-three states).
413. See supra note 413 (citing the Broker Duty Article).
414. See infra notes 415-84 and accompanying text (discussing the elements that state legisla-
tures need to consider in drafting legislation).
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One of the threshold issues in any legislative scheme is whether
the disclosure obligation should be imposed on the broker or the
seller. As earlier discussed, the Prevailing Disclosure Act places the
duty on the seller.4 15 Facially, placing the duty on the seller makes
the legislation appear more comprehensive, since disclosure will oc-
cur in all transactions, and no one knows the home's defects better
than the seller."16 If the requirement applies only to the broker, it
will be applicable only to transactions involving a broker. 17 While it
is true that a large majority of transactions do involve a broker, the
legislation would still omit those transactions in which the seller
does not employ a broker. 1 8 If the purpose of disclosure legislation
is to inform the buyer so that he will not overpay or be unpleasantly
surprised by defects discovered after purchase, the requirement
should apply in all transactions, not just broker transactions. As a
practical matter, if a seller retains a broker to represent the seller in
the transaction, the broker will probably order or conduct the in-
spection, if one is required, or assist the seller in preparing the dis-
closure form if it is not based on an inspection. If no broker is in-
volved, the statutory duty should fall on the seller.
Another reason for imposing the inspection and disclosure obliga-
tion on the seller is to guard against avoidance of the statutory re-
quirement. If legislation imposes the requirement on the broker, a
seller desiring to conceal a defect may simply choose to sell the
house without a broker. If the obligation is imposed on the seller, it
applies to all transactions."" The legislation can put an enforcement
burden on the broker, if one is involved, to make sure the statutory
disclosure obligation is complied with. But, the seller cannot avoid
compliance as he or she could if only the broker were responsible for
disclosure.42 0
415. See supra notes 206-10, 396 and accompanying text (discussing the burden under the
Prevailing Disclosure Act).
416. See Curnes, supra note 45, at 480 (stating that placing the duty upon the seller would
help to prevent the buyer from mistaking the property's value); see also Tracy, supra note 8, at
173-74 (proposing the rejection of the caveat emptor doctrine and the imposition of an affirmative
duty to disclose on the seller and requiring sellers to record the nature and extent of contamina-
tion at the time of transfer). But see Culum, supra note 118, at 333-34 (discussing the policy
reasons for imposing a duty on the broker to disclose to buyers all facts materially affecting desir-
ability of the property which are known to the broker or could be discovered by him through
reasonable diligence).
417. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 324.360 (Michie 1993).
418. See id.
419. See supra note 396 and accompanying text.
420. Compare supra notes 40-116 and accompanying text (discussing the common law duties
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If the duty is placed on the broker, another issue which must be
specified in legislation is whether the obligation applies to the listing
broker or the co-operating, selling, broker." 1 The answer here
should be the listing broker, for reasons analogous to those for plac-
ing the duty on the seller rather than the buyer."22
The selling broker shows a number of houses, usually listed in the
area multi-list system, to various buyers. 23 He cannot be held re-
sponsible for obtaining an inspection report on each house he shows
to a buyer. On the other hand, the listing broker is the one who has
first contact with the property, gathers all of the information that
goes into the listing, and places the home in the stream of com-
merce.42 4 Therefore, imposing the inspection requirement on the list-
ing broker is the appropriate place in the system to assure the infor-
mation is correctly obtained and uniformly distributed.
One issue which should be clear in any broker disclosure legisla-
tion is whether the broker should merely solicit information from
the seller and pass it on in some form to the buyer, or whether the
broker should have a duty physically to inspect the property, trans-
mitting to the buyer the results of that inspection. The same consid-
eration might also arise in the Prevailing Disclosure Act, which re-
quires only seller disclosure.42 5 Seller disclosure statutes can require
the seller to disclose all that he or she knows concerning the prop-
erty, or they can require a more extensive physical inspection.4 26
If the purpose of either form of legislation is to fully and fairly
inform the purchaser concerning the habitability, value and desira-
bility of the property, a strong argument is presented for requiring a
physical inspection of the property. 27 Without a physical inspection,
of the seller) with note 396 and accompanying text (discussing the Prevailing Disclosure Act).
421. See GAUDIO, supra note 8, at 347 (stating that under traditional rules of agency and
brokerage law, the selling broker is a subagent of the listing broker).
422. See Culum, supra note 118, at 346-47 (arguing that since the listing broker has the first
opportunity to inspect, he should have the obligation to perform the initial inspection).
423. GAUDIO, supra note 8, at 362 (stating that having only limited familiarity with the prop-
erty, the selling broker can not be expected to have knowledge of the defects).
424. See id. (stating that because the listing broker has a continuous familiarity with the prop-
erty, the listing broker is expected to reveal its conditions to the buyer).
425. See supra notes 206-12 and accompanying text (discussing the Prevailing Disclosure Act).
426. See supra note 349 and accompanying text (stating that the Prevailing Disclosure Act
requires all material information be disclosed); see also supra note 359 and accompanying text
(stating that the Maine Act requires only the disclosure of known material defects).
427. A complete, professional home inspection typically includes the following items: structural
(roof, walls, foundation), electrical, plumbing, heat/air conditioning, water supply, sewage dispo-
sal, appliances, windows, basement, gutters/downspouts, site, exterior, radon, termites/insects,
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both the seller and the broker, depending on the type of statute, will
disclose only what the seller actually knows.42 8 This level of disclos-
ure does not truly protect the buyer.429 Defects may exist in a house
where the seller has lived for a long time, such that the seller has
come to accept the defect and may neglect to disclose it. Worse, the
seller may purposely fail to disclose a defect that she believes might
affect marketability. That the seller (or broker) may be liable under
the statute for a failure to disclose defects is cold comfort to a buyer
who is disappointed in his expectation that he has received complete
information on the home's defects.430 Clearly, the goal of protecting
the buyer is better served by a statutory requirement of a physical
inspection and disclosure. Many defects, such as electrical, plumb-
ing, and heating and air conditioning, may be unknown to the seller
or not readily discernable to the casual visual inspection. They may
be hidden in walls or other inaccessible spaces. Systems may be on
the verge of failure, a fact of which the seller may be ignorant, but
which would be revealed by a physical inspection.
If a physical inspection is preferable, there are a number of prac-
tical and economic factors which a legislature must consider in de-
termining the extent of the inspection duty. The first question in-
volves whether the inspection should be conducted by the real estate
broker or by a professional home inspector.481 Under the Prevailing
and general condition.
428. See supra notes 40-159 and accompanying text (discussing the duties of sellers and bro-
kers under common law).
429. See supra notes 168-81 and accompanying text (discussing the obligations placed on pur-
chasers under common law to provide for their own inspection in order to have full knowledge of
defects).
430. See Zeit, supra note 18, at 168-69 (discussing cases which impose liability on a broker for
merely repeating a seller's false assertions because the repeated assurances led the buyer to rely
on them to his detriment, whereas the broker's silence would have been a shield against liability).
However, most courts hold that a broker does not breach a duty to the buyer if the broker's
disclosure is based on the seller's statement. GAUDIO, supra note 8, at 360-61, 363-64 (discussing
the disagreement over whether the broker can rely on the statements of the seller without making
his own investigation).
431. See Culum, supra note 118, at 347. It is always prudent for the buyer of real estate to
contract for his or her own home inspection; many real estate contracts are contingent on buyer's
receipt of and satisfaction with an inspection report. Or, the parties can agree that the seller will
repair defects discovered in the inspection of a certain type or up to a certain dollar amount. If
state disclosure legislation required a professional inspection by the seller or broker as part of the
listing, it would shift the inspection from being a contract contingency to be performed by the
buyer at the buyer's expense after the contract is signed, to a part of the listing to be performed
by the seller at the seller's expense prior to listing and showing the property. In any event, the
extent of the professional inspection and the results reported should be the same in both cases.
Although probably unnecessary, the buyer could still insist on an inspection contingency clause in
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Disclosure Act any required inspection must be by a professional
inspector.4"2 The only other choice for a physical inspection under
the Prevailing Disclosure Act would be the seller. Since the seller is
not a professional, and could not be expected to discover defects be-
yond those of which the seller already has knowledge, seller inspec-
tion does not give the buyer any additional protection. The only way
to supplement the Prevailing Disclosure Act to give the buyer the
added protection of a physical inspection is to require that the seller
retain a professional inspector.
A more difficult question arises in a statute modeled on the Cali-
fornia Broker Duty Article.4 33 If the required disclosure must be
made by the broker, and the legislature opts for a physical inspec-
tion requirement, is there a sufficiently increased benefit to the pur-
chaser to require a professional inspection rather than a broker in-
spection? Although they are not professional home inspectors,
brokers handle a large number of properties, and they have some
competence to know what to look for and to find defects in a physi-
cal inspection."34 If the broker were to conduct.a complete and ob-
jective physical inspection of the property, the broker would proba-
bly discover most of the same problems as a professional
inspector. 435 On the other hand, the broker is less than objective
since he is compensated only if the transaction is completed. This
fact creates an inherent subjectivity in the way the broker deals
with the property. Thus, even though brokers may be competent to
inspect the property, this inherent conflict of interest is a strong ar-
gument in favor of requiring that disclosure based on a physical in-
spection be based on an independent inspection, even in broker
transactions.436 In addition, the buyer obtains an additional benefit
from the requirement for a professional inspection; if the inspector
errs in his or her inspection or report, the buyer may have recourse
against the inspector's errors and omissions or other liability
the contract of sale.
432. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1102-1102.5 (West Supp. 1994).
433. Id. §§ 2079-2019.10.
434. See Culum, supra note 118, at 342 (arguing that since brokers are involved in countless
real estate transactions, they should be held to a professional standard).
435. See id. at 342-43 (arguing that a broker's profession regulates itself by enforcing profes-
sional standards of care, by licensing requirements, and by expanding professional knowledge
within the profession).
436. See Curnes, supra note 45, at 480 (advocating that Virginia should enact a statute which
includes requiring sellers to have their property inspected by an expert prior to the sale).
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insurance. 3
Another factor that bears on defining the parameters of any re-
quired inspection is the scope of the inspection. The key question is
whether the inspection should cover only readily accessible areas or
consist of a more complete investigation. 38 Again, this is related to
the identity of the inspector.48 9 A seller inspection cannot be ex-
pected to extend beyond readily accessible areas; a professional
home inspector will look for hidden defects and examine hard to
reach areas." °0 The real question arises if a statute requires a broker
inspection. Based on an assumed level of expertise, it would be fair
to require brokers to perform a more complete inspection. However,
brokers are not as competent or experienced as professional home
inspectors to perform a truly complete inspection.441 Clearly, if the
public policy goal of disclosure legislation is to fully inform the
buyer of potential defects, a full, rather than a visual inspection is
preferable. Following the scope of inspection logic would argue for
broker inspection at a minimum and a professional inspection as
preferable.
If policy moves in the direction of a professional inspection, the
legislature must deal with the issue of cost. Inspection and disclos-
ure by the seller is cost-free to the parties and provides the buyer
with no additional protection. Although it is true that the broker
may be liable for negligence or misfeasance if he does the inspection
himself, this liability probably would not add greatly to the broker's
existing liability insurance costs and the broker probably would not
make an additional charge for it. 4"2 Brokers are compensated almost
universally on a commission basis, based on a percentage of the
sales price. The commission covers all of the broker's activities in
marketing the property, assisting the buyer, and closing the transac-
437. See generally id. at 470-71 (noting that a vendor could limit liability from a strict liability
standard for nondisclosure of defects by having the property inspected by a competent expert).
438. See Culum, supra note 118, at 343 (arguing that at minimum, a broker's duty to inspect
should include areas "reasonably and normally" accessible upon inspection and to detect and dis-
close hidden-but-discoverable defects).
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. One commentator recognizes that the appropriate scope of a broker's inspection would be
patent, observable defects. Id. at 341; see also GAUDIO, supra note 8, at 361 (arguing that difficult
to ascertain defects have traditionally not been within the broker's sphere of inspection).
442. See generally supra notes 117-66 and accompanying text (discussing general broker duties
and liabilities). For a contrary view on both points, see Meyer, supra note 117, at 271 (arguing
that a broker must be compensated not only for time spent investigating, but also for the expense
of an independent inspection service, as well as for the broker's increased liability).
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tion. The broker must undertake some level of property inspection
for no other reason than to become familiar with the property and
to make suggestions to the seller to repair or improve the house so it
"shows" better. Requiring the broker to undertake a more complete
physical inspection of the property for disclosure purposes does not
materially add to the time or effort she devotes to the property.""8
Since brokers rarely impose additional charges for aspects of their
performance, other than out-of-pocket expenses, it is not unfair to
require a more complete inspection by brokers without charge to
sellers.
On the other hand, the old adage "you get what you pay for"
might apply to opting for a broker inspection solely because it im-
poses no additional cost on the transaction.44' The best protection
comes from a professional inspection." 5 Depending on the market
area, type of property, and the items included in the inspection,
home inspection costs typically range from $200 to $500. If the leg-
islature mandates a professional inspection, it should allocate the
cost of the inspection in the legislation." 6
A statute requiring a professional inspection should require that
the seller obtain and pay for the inspection. If the cost is placed on
the buyer, there is a problem with multiple inspections by successive
buyers, each having to pay for the cost of an inspection." 7 At pre-
sent, ordering a home inspection is optional with the buyer; many
contracts are contingent on the buyer ordering an inspection report
and being satisfied with the results." 8 If a buyer orders a profes-
sional inspection, and then terminates the contract based on the in-
spection results, or for another reason, the buyer clearly pays the
inspection costs.
The situation would be different, however, if state statute man-
dates an inspection. Once the first buyer orders an inspection, that
should be sufficient; however, there is no mechanism to "assign"
that inspection to a subsequent purchaser. A mandatory inspection
for'mat might therefore result in the economic waste of successive
443. See supra note 442 and accompanying text (discussing broker compensation).
444. See supra note 442 and accompanying text (discussing broker compensation).
445. See supra note 442 and accompanying text (discussing broker compensation).
446. See Meyer, supra note 117, at 271 (arguing that a statute must provide for compensation
to the broker for the expense of an independent inspection service).
447. Curnes, supra note 45, at 469.
448. See supra notes 167-81 and accompanying text (discussing the obligations of the
purchaser).
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inspections of the same property paid for by successive buyers."""
The same is true if the legislature sought to divide equally the
inspection cost between buyer and seller. While equal division of the
cost appears fair, since both seller and buyer benefit from the in-
spection, it is in fact worse economically for the seller. If the first
buyer cancels, and successive buyers require new inspections, the
seller would wind up paying one-half the cost for a series of inspec-
tions, with no additional benefit to the seller.
Therefore, the only reasonable resolution of the cost issue, were
the legislature to mandate a professional inspection, is to impose the
requirement and the cost on the seller. The seller is the party mar-
keting the property. It is transactionally appropriate for the seller to
order a house inspection, pay for it, and present it to all prospective
buyers along with the other information about the property.45 All
buyers could rely on the one inspection; by its terms the inspector is
liable to the ultimate purchaser and, therefore, multiple or succes-
sive inspections would be unnecessary. 51 Very few, if any, purchas-
ers would likely insist on their own house inspection when presented
with an independent inspection report by the seller. 5 2 The buyer
could review the report and make a decision concerning the physical
condition of the property even before signing the contract of sale. 5 3
At worst, the buyer will make the contract of sale contingent on the
buyer's review of the inspection report. 54 It is therefore transaction-
ally fair and economically efficient to place both the obligation and
the expense of obtaining a professional inspection report on the
seller.455
449. Curnes, supra note 45, at 469 (noting that the multiple inspections by consecutive pur-
chasers results in considerable waste).
450. See id. (stating that it is more economically efficient to allocate the risk of unknown de-
fects to the seller since he need only make a single investigation).
451. Id. at 470-71 (noting that under a strict liability standard a seller could still be held liable
for defects that existed at the time of sale but were not disclosed because of a failure to discover in
the inspection).
452. See id. at 471 (noting the difficulty of holding the seller liable for not disclosing undis-
closed defects if inspection was performed by a competent expert).
453. If the buyer knows in advance the physical condition of the property, this knowledge will
probably affect price negotiations.
454. The buyer could evaluate the report during the executory period or hire a consultant to
review it for the buyer. If the buyer hires a consultant, the cost should be much less than a full
inspection and would properly be at the buyer's expense.
455. The seller would be free, of course, to negotiate in the contract that the buyer will pay the
inspection cost or that the parties will split the cost. Or, as with most other expenses of the sale
(including the brokerage commission), the seller may simply include the inspection cost in the
sales price; see Zeit, supra note 18, at 173-74.
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One effect of legislation requiring a professional inspection report
is that the buyer will be better informed, with the expected result
that the information will find its way into the seller/buyer price ne-
gotiations. This result is assured if the seller must obtain the inspec-
tion report at the time of listing. It is likely to occur as well if the
inspection and disclosure occur at a later point in the transaction.
This result is entirely fair; the same result is obtained in most trans-
actions now without the benefit of a statutorily mandated inspection.
Many real estate contracts are contingent on the buyer obtaining a
satisfactory inspection report, meaning that the buyer can cancel the
contract if the inspection results are unsatisfactory. However, these
clauses are often drafted to permit the alternate remedy of seller
repair or sales price reduction, depending on the type and extent of
defects revealed by the inspection. Requiring the seller to provide
the buyer with an inspection report prior to executing the contract
of sale is guaranteed to motivate the buyer to bargain for a lower
price or seller repairs. Since this is often the current practice, the
seller would not be greatly disadvantaged by a statutory require-
ment to disclose defects.
If the purpose of mandatory disclosure is to achieve a rational
market where essential information is known in advance, there can
be no complaint that the furnishing of the information may affect
the economics of the transaction. All the statute would do is man-
date information. Whether the buyer then decides, based on that
information, not to purchase the property, to ask the seller to per-
form repairs, or to attempt to negotiate a lower price, is properly an
issue of negotiation between buyer and seller.
Any legislation mandating disclosure must clearly identify the
types of things which must be disclosed. As most of the existing
disclosure legislation provides, all defects in the physical condition
of the structure itself should be disclosed.456 In addition, all items
upon which the house is physically dependent should be disclosed,
such as site conditions on the lot, drainage, sewer or septic system,
water or well, gas, electric, and other utilities.457 While these items
456. See supra note 214 (discussing California Disclosure Act), 244 (discussing Maine Act),
269 (discussing Wisconsin Act), 282 (discussing Kentucky Act), 290 (discussing New Hampshire
Act), 296 (discussing Alaska Act), 322 (discussing the Later Ten Acts) and accompanying text.
457. See, e.g., Curtiss-Warner Corp. v. Thirkettle, 137 A. 408, 408 (N.J. Eq. 1927) (holding
that vendors had a duty to disclose condition of street access along the lot purchased by buyers).
But see Sevin v. Kelshaw, 611 A.2d 1232, 1237-38 (Pa. Super. 1992) (holding that vendor had no
duty to disclose existence of water line easement because it was not a material fact); Zeit, supra
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are the bare minimum for disclosure purposes, there may be other
items that would be material to the buyer's decision but which are
more judgmental than actual physical condition.4 58  For example,
should mandatory disclosure include environmental conditions in the
area, such as a dump site, 459 inconveniences in the area, such as
congested and noisy streets, 60 potential factors, such as a planned
new highway near the property,"61 or prejudicial factors such as the
close proximity of a group home or low-income housing?462 Even
with regard to physical factors of the house itself, should disclosure
include previous uses of the site, such as industrial use,463 the health
of former occupants, such as an HIV-positive resident, 4' " or prior
occurrences, such as a grisly murder in the house?
46 5
note 18, at 174 (suggesting that soil conditions may be excluded from the disclosure obligation).
458. See generally McEvoy, supra note 8 (arguing that the psychological effect of such events
as suicide, AIDS, murder, and other felonies on the buyer are relevant to the purchase decision).
459. See, e.g., Strawn v. Canuso, 638 A.2d 141, 148 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (holding that
builder and seller brokers of new homes had duty to disclose to potential buyers the existence of a
landfill), cert. granted, 645 A.2d 134 (N.J. 1994).
460. See, e.g., Coral Gables, Inc. v. Mayer, 271 N.Y.S. 662, 664 (N.Y. App. Div. 1934) (hold-
ing that omission to notify buyer of proximity of an obnoxious business development was
fraudulent).
461. See, e.g., Whitlach v. Bertagnolli, 609 P.2d 902, 904-05 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that
intentionally concealing a planned future highway condemnation of part of the property being sold
constituted a cause of action even though the injury is based upon a future act).
462. Or, perhaps, the neighbors from hell. Jennings, supra note 8, at 48-49. The California
Disclosure Article requires disclosure of "neighborhood noise problems or other nuisances." Id. at
49; see also CAL. CIv. CODE § 1102.6 (West 1994) (requiring seller to indicate in the disclosure
form whether or not seller is aware of "neighborhood noise problems or other nuisances"); Appen-
dix (requiring the seller to disclose this information).
463. See, e.g., United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 850 F. Supp. 993, 1058-60
(W.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding liability for clean-up costs of former industrial dump site).
464. See VanCamp v. Bradford, 623 N.E.2d 731, 731 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pleas 1993) (giving a
general discussion of disclosure requirements of psychologically stigmatized properties); Jennings,
supra note 8, at 50 (identifying communicable diseases as a controversial psychological issue in
real estate disclosure duties); see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-35.5-101(1)(A) (West 1994)
(providing that there is no duty for a broker to disclose that a former occupant of the property is,
or was at any time suspected to be, infected with HIV, AIDS, or any other disease which has been
determined by medical evidence to be highly unlikely to be transmitted through the occupancy of
a dwelling place). How about bacterial contamination of farmland? See Green Spring Farms v.
Spring Green Farm Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 492 N.W.2d 392, 397 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that caveat emptor does not excuse real estate vendors form fully disclosing to potential buyers the
existence of salmonella contamination which may be material to purchase and which purchaser is
in a poor position to discover).
465. See. e.g., Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133-34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that
multiple murders committed on property is a material fact in the consideration of purchase). See
generally McEvoy, supra note 8, at 579 (discussing the Reed case). Similarly, what about disclos-
ure of ghosts on the property? See Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672, 674 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1991) (holding that vendor has duty to disclose to purchaser the existence of poltergeists on
property); see generally Jennings, supra note 8, at 51-53 (discussing the murders in Reed and
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Once disclosure goes beyond the structure, the lot, and the utili-
ties serving it, problems of definition abound. The classes of things
to disclose is somewhat dependent on the characteristics of the indi-
vidual buyer. Obviously, any non-structural or off-site disclosure
would be relevant to the extent it affects the "value or desirability"
in a material manner.466 However, "value," "desirability" and "ma-
terial" are all very subjective terms.46 It is very difficult to define
what factors might materially disturb a buyer and what might not.
For example, a landfill one mile from the property may bother one
buyer but be immaterial to another. Proximity from the property is
very subjective and may differ for different types of off-site hazards.
Since off-site and non-structural factors are so subjective, it is virtu-
ally impossible to legislatively establish parameters for this type of
disclosure. Purchasers should bear some responsibility for ascertain-
ing factors affecting the property which may not be to their liking.
Should a seller have to disclose the poor performance of public
schools to potential buyers, especially since this may involve subjec-
tive judgments and may not be relevant, except as a matter of re-
sale, to buyers who are childless? School performance may in fact
be unknown to the sellers if they are childless. Especially with re-
gard to off-site, neighborhood conditions, buyers should make their
own determinations based on what is important to them. It is true
that some off-site or non-structural conditions may be difficult for
the buyer to discover, but the area is entirely too subjective to lend
itself to rational, uniform regulation.
Most of the existing disclosure legislation applies the duty to sales
of existing residences rather than newly constructed houses.468 This
concluding that nondisclosure of psychological factors is misrepresentation).
It is interesting that a number of states, bucking the disclosure trend, have enacted shield laws
protecting sellers and brokers from disclosures of this type of information. See, e.g., Jennings,
supra note 8, at 51-53 & n.78 (listing jurisdictions which have passed shield laws); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 38-35.5-101(l)(b) (West 1994) (providing that there is no duty for a broker or
salesperson to disclose "that the property was the site of a homicide or other felony or of a
suicide").
466. Strawn v. Canuso, 638 A.2d 141, 149 (N.J. Super. Ct.), cert. granted, 645 A.2d 134 (N.J.
1994); see also McEvoy, supra note 8, at 579-81 (discussing the case of Reed v. King, 193 Cal.
Rptr. 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), and arguing that a prospective purchaser must have the right to
consider all relevant facts regarding occurrences that may have taken place on the property);
Curnes, supra note 45, at 477-78 (suggesting an approach which requires disclosure of conditions
which have a substantial bearing on the value the buyer may place on the property or may have
an adverse impact on the market value of the property).
467. Jennings, supra note 8, at 43-44.
468. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
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seems to be the correct approach. In most states, sales of newly con-
structed dwellings are covered by well-established warranty doc-
trines of merchantability, fitness, and habitability."8 9 Several states
have enacted legislation requiring that builders expressly or im-
pliedly warrant the new home.47 ° Even where warranties are not
statutorily mandated, many builders offer warranties as a marketing
tool. In addition, all new construction is inspected by state or local
building inspectors during construction.471 While such inspections do
not assure absence of defects, they do provide adequate protection to
the purchaser.
This combination of common law, statute, and practice suffi-
ciently covers the new house construction field that purchasers are
not in need of further defect disclosure protection. It would add
nothing in the way of additional benefit to require an inspection of
the property prior to transfer. Applying an inspection requirement
to new houses would add an element of cost without additional
benefit.
It is common for buyers to insist on a contract inspection clause
and to commission a professional inspection pursuant to the rights
reserved in that clause. Disclosure legislation may obviate the need
for and expense of this form of buyer protection. If legislation
merely requires disclosure by the seller or broker of facts known to
the seller, buyers would be wise to negotiate a buyer inspection
clause and to order a professional home inspection. If the legislation
mandates that the seller or broker provide a professional inspection
report to the buyer, the buyer should not have to go to the trouble
469. See, e.g., Cochran v. Keeton, 252 S. 2d 313, 315 (Ala. 1971) (holding that the rule of
caveat emptor does not apply in the sale by a builder-vendor of a newly constructed house); Wim-
mer v. Down East Properties, Inc., 406 A.2d 88, 92-93 (Me. 1979) (finding an implied warranty
of workmanship to apply to contractors building new houses for purpose of resale); Mobley v.
Copeland, 828 S.W.2d 717, 727-29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (denying builder-vendor warranty of
implied habitability where home had been previously occupied for twelve years prior to purchas-
ers' possession); McDonald v. Mianecki, 398 A.2d 1283, 1292 (N.J. 1979) (applying the builder-
vendor warranty of implied habitability to a new home, even though builder was not a mass-
developer); see also Curnes, supra note 45, at 466 (noting that in the sale of new homes, most
states have replaced the caveat emptor doctrine with an implied warranty of fitness).
470. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 46:3B-4 (1994) (assigning liability to the builder of a new
home for "any defect therein which is covered by the warranty in accordance with its terms and
conditions"); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-70.1 (Michie Supp. 1994) (providing for implied warranties in
the contract for sale of new homes).
471. For examples of such statutes, see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 38660 (West 1988); MIcH. STAT.
ANN. § 5.2949(12), (13) (Callaghan 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-132, -133 (West 1994);
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 381 (McKinney 1987); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 130(1) (McKinney 1987).
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and expense of what, at that point, would be a duplicative
inspection.
However, disclosure legislation should not expressly interfere with
the buyer's ability to negotiate whatever clause the buyer feels is
necessary for his or her protection. Even if the legislation requires a
professional inspection and disclosure of the results of that inspec-
tion, the buyer may feel a need to have the buyer's "own" inspec-
tion. 47 '2 This should remain a right of the buyer. If the buyer wants
to negotiate an inspection clause in the contract, and order and pay
for his or her own inspection, that should remain the buyer's right.
It may be unlikely that many buyers will opt for their own inspec-
tion if the seller is providing a professional inspection report, but
that is a matter that should be left to the buyer's discretion without
legislative interference.
Suppose a defect is overlooked in a statutorily mandated inspec-
tion. What should be the rights and liabilities of the parties? If state
statute requires a professional inspection, the inspector should be li-
able under errors and omissions insurance to the injured party. The
legislature may want to consider regulation of home inspectors if
professional inspections become universally required as a result of
the adoption of disclosure legislation."' Such regulation should in-
clude, aside from the licensing, experience, and testing procedures
common to licensing schemes, requirements that the inspector will
be liable to the ultimate purchaser of the house who relied on the
inspection report, and that the inspector maintain insurance at a
prescribed minimum level. If there is liability on the part of the
house inspector, there is no need to create liability in the broker or
seller, since they, almost as much as the buyer, have relied on the
professional inspection.
If a state opts for legislation requiring broker inspection or simple
disclosure of what the seller knows, the legislation should clearly
establish liability on the person making the disclosure. If the broker
inspects and discloses, it is fair that the broker should be liable for
472. See Meyer, supra note 117, at 270 (arguing that buyers' reliance on brokers is misplaced
since, in serving the seller, the broker may act adversely to buyers' interests); Zeit, supra note 18,
at 173 (arguing that buyers should have an obligation independent of a broker to access property
for their own protection).
473. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, §§ 16(c), 23(c)(1) (West 1994) (mandating that
professional inspectors obtain a license before conducting inspections for a buyer or seller); see
Culum, supra note 118, at 347-48 (arguing that courts and legislatures should ensure that the
broker profession does not control the inspection business).
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his or her failure to discover or adequately disclose defects. Under
the Prevailing Disclosure Act, only the seller discloses. 4  In this
scheme, the seller should be liable for what he or she fails to dis-
close or discloses improperly. 7 If the legislature opts for the hybrid
scheme where the broker discloses only information obtained from
the seller, it would be good policy to make both the broker and the
seller liable. As earlier discussed, the broker disclosure-seller infor-
mation scheme is inherently weak and does not sufficiently protect
the buyer.4 70 However, if the broker is rendered liable for incorrect
or omitted information obtained from the seller, the broker should
be more diligent in ferreting out such information. In this manner,
the weakness of this type of statute can be somewhat strengthened
to the benefit of the buyer.
The remaining question, assuming either broker or seller liability,
is whether that liability ought to be premised on a negligence or
strict liability theory. Negligence is often difficult to prove, espe-
cially when dealing with broker liability under the broker disclosure-
seller information format. If the guiding principle of disclosure leg-
islation is protection of the buyer, basing seller/broker responsibility
on strict liability principles would strengthen the legislative
purpose.4 7
A related question is whether statutory required disclosure should
constitute a representation or warranty between seller and buyer.
Seller disclosure, or broker disclosure of seller information, should
be actionable by the buyer if material items are omitted or misrep-
resented. Therefore, a statutory scheme that bases disclosure on the
seller's statements should form the basis for buyer's suit, either on
the basis of strict liability,4 78 or as a breach of warranty under the
sales contract between the parties. 79 While strict liability provides a
more certain remedy for the buyer, a legislature desiring to balance
the rights and liabilities of the parties may opt to allow buyer recov-
474. See supra notes 206-12 and accompanying text (discussing the disclosure obligations
under the Prevailing Disclosure Act).
475. See, e.g., supra note 300 and accompanying text (discussing ALASKA STAT. § 34.70.020)
(Supp. 1993)).
476. See supra notes 418-37 and accompanying text (discussing this author's recommendations
for disclosure duties).
477. See Zeit, supra note 18, at 169 (discussing Alaska case which imposed strict liability on a
broker for conveying incorrect information to the buyer).
478. See supra note 477 and accompanying text (discussing strict liability in this context).
479. See supra notes 468-71 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of a warranty
theory).
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ery based on breach of warranty. Any such liability should survive
settlement, since otherwise the doctrine of merger would erase seller
liability for misstatements in the disclosure form, which is part of
the contract. However, if the statute provides for broker disclosure,
even based on seller information, this author would prefer strict lia-
bility. Since the broker is a professional, he or she should be held to
a higher standard. The legislature would want the broker to discover
all defects that are reasonably discoverable (even when the broker's
duty is based on seller information), and can encourage this type of
performance by making the broker strictly liable in the performance
of his or her statutory obligations.
CONCLUSION
The unimpeded development of the common law would provide
sufficient buyer protection, without the necessity of state legislation.
The Prevailing Disclosure Act weakens buyer protection compared
to that developed by the common law. There are some benefits to
legislation, however, but only if the legislation is comprehensive and
clear in mandating an inspection and disclosure duty. The best solu-
tion is a statute mandating that the seller or listing broker retain
and provide an inspection report by a professional home inspector.
Such an inspection should include all material elements of the
house, including physical systems and other items located in inac-
cessible areas.
One benefit of a statutory solution over continued development of
the common law is that legislation would specify what items and
systems must be inspected, which would make the disclosure obliga-
tion more uniform and less subject to interpretation. The item by
item development of the common law leaves areas of uncertainty.
What areas must be disclosed, what types of defects, and the mate-
riality of the defect must all be developed through litigation. 80 One
major advantage of legislation would be to clearly established the
types of things that must be disclosed, thus making the disclosure
480. A good, recent example is Strawn v. Canuso, 638 A.2d 141 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.),
cert. granted, 645 A.2d 134 (N.J. 1994), in which the court mandated disclosure of off-site condi-
tions which "based on reasonable foreseeability, might materially affect the value or desirability of
the property." Id. at 149. The court did not define the types of off-site conditions that must be
disclosed, the distance from or effect on the property necessary to trigger disclosure, or give any
parameters to the very subjective concepts of value or desirability. New Jersey is now wide open
for future litigation to define the parameters of the obligation created in Strawn.
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duty less subject to interpretive difficulties.48 1 A clearly defined dis-
closure obligation coupled with a professional inspection should
serve to rationalize the seller's disclosure obligation and provide a
high level of protection for the buyer.
481. See supra notes 457-687 and accompanying text (discussing the items which should be
included in a statutory disclosure form).
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APPENDIX
REAL ESTATE TRANSFER DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
THIS DISCLOSURE STATEMENT CONCERNS THE REAL
PROPERTY SITUATED IN THE CITY OF I
COUNTY OF , STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
DESCRIBED AS
THIS SETTLEMENT IS A DISCLOSURE OF THE CONDI-
TION OF THE ABOVE DESCRIBED PROPERTY IN COM-
PLIANCE WITH SECTION 1102 OF THE CIVIL CODE AS
OF , 19-. IT IS NOT A WARRANTY OF ANY
KIND BY THE SELLER(S) OR ANY AGENT(S) REPRE-
SENTING ANY PRINCIPAL(S) IN THIS TRANSACTION,
AND IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR ANY INSPECTIONS OR
WARRANTIES THE PRINCIPAL(S) MAY WISH TO
OBTAIN.
I
COORDINATION WITH OTHER DISCLOSURE FORMS
This Real Estate Transfer Disclosure Statement is made pursuant to
Section 1102 of the Civil Code. Other statutes require disclosures,
depending upon the details of the particular real estate transaction
(for example: special study zone and purchase-money liens on resi-
dential property).
Substituted Disclosures: The following disclosures have or will be
made in connection with this real estate transfer, and are intended
to satisfy the disclosure obligations on this form, where the subject
matter the same:
(list all substituted disclosure forms to be used in
connection with this transaction)
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II
SELLERS INFORMATION
The Seller discloses the following information with the knowledge
that even though this is not a warranty, prospective Buyers may rely
on this information in deciding whether and on what terms to
purchase the subject property. Seller hereby authorizes any agent(s)
representing any principal(s) in this transaction to provide a copy of
this statement to any person or entity in connection with any actual
or anticipated sale of property.
THE FOLLOWING ARE REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY
THE SELLER(S) AND ARE NOT THE REPRESENTATIONS
OF THE AGENT(S), IF ANY, THIS INFORMATION IS A
DISCLOSURE AND IS NOT INTENDED TO BE PART OF
ANY CONTRACT BETWEEN THE BUYER AND SELLER.
Seller -- is -- is not occupying the property.
a
A. The subject property has the items checked below (read
across):
-Range
-Dishwasher
_Washer/Dryer
Hookups
-.Burgler Alarms
__T.V. Antenna
-Central Heating
.. Wall/Window Air
Cndtng.
-Septic Tank
_Patio/Decking
-Sauna
_-Security Gate(s)
Garage:
Pool:Spa Heater:
Water Heater:
-Oven
-Trash Compactor
-_Window Screens
Smoke Detector(s)
-Satellite Dish
-Central Air
Cndtng.
-Sprinklers
-Sump Pump
-Built-in Barbeque
-Pool
._Automatic Garage
Door Opener(s)
_-Attached
-Gas
-Gas
-Microwave
-Garbage Disposal
-_Rain Gutters
-Fire Alarm
-Intercom
-Evapor. Cooler(s)
-Public Sewer
System
-Water Softener
-_Gazebo
-Spa -Hot Tub
-_Number Remote
Controls
-Not Attached
-Solar
__Private Utility
-Carport
-Electric
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Water Supply: -City -Well -Other
Gas Supply: -Utility -Bottled
Exhaust Fan(s) in- 220 Volt Wiring in - Fireplace(s) in.
Gas Starter- Roof(s): Type: Age: (approx.)
Other:
Are there, to the best of your (Seller's) knowledge, any of the above
that are not in operating condition?
-Yes -No. If yes, then describe.
(Attach additional sheets if necessary):
B. Are you (Seller) aware of any significant defects/malfunctions
in any of the following? -Yes - No. If yes, check appropriate
space(s) below.
-Interior Walls -Ceilings -Floors -Exterior Walls -_Insulation
Roof(s) -Windows -Doors -Foundation -Slab(s) -Driveways
-Sidewalks __Walls/Fences -Electrical Systems -
Plumbing/Sewers/Septics -Other Structural Components
(Describe: )
If any of the above is checked, explain. (Attach additional sheets if
necessary):
C. Are you (Seller) aware of any of the following:
1. Substances materials, or products which may be an environ-
mental hazard such as, but not limited to, asbestos, formaldehyde,
radon gas, lead-based paint, fuel or chemical storage tanks, and con-
taminated soil or water on the subject property ...... Yes -No
2. Features of the property shared in common with adjoining
landowners, such as walls, fences, and driveways, whose use or re-
sponsibility for maintenance may have an effect on the subject
property ..................................... . Yes -N o
3. Any encroachments, easements or similar matters that may af-
fect your interest in the subject property ........... Yes .No
4. Rooms additions, structural modifications, or other alterations
or repairs made without necessary permits ......... Yes -No
5. Room additions, structural modifications, or other alterations
or repairs not in compliance with building codes . .. Yes -_No
6. Landfill (compacted or otherwise) on the property or any por-
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tion thereof .................................. . Yes -No
7. Any settling from any cause, or slippage, sliding, or other soil
problems .............. . . .Yes -N o
8. Flooding, drainage or grading problems ....... Yes -No
9. Major damage to the property or any of the structures from
fire, earthquake, floods, or landslides .............. -Yes -No
10. Any zoning violations, nonconforming uses, violations of "set-
back" requirements ............................ Yes -No
11. Neighborhood noise problems or other nuisances ..........
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Y e s - N o
12. CC&R's or other deed restrictions or obligations ..........
. . . . . . . . . . I. . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Y es - N o
13. Homeowners' Association which has any authority over the
subject property ............................... Yes -N o
14. Any "common area" (facilities such as pools, tennis courts,
walkways, or other areas co-owned in undivided interest with
others) ...................................... . Y es -N o
15. Any notices of abatement or citations against the property .
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Y e s - N o
16. Any lawsuits against the seller threatening to or affecting this
real property .................................. Y es -N o
If the answer to any of these is yes, explain. (Attach additional
sheets if necessary):
Seller certifies that the information herein is true and correct to the
best of the Seller's knowledge as of the date signed by the Seller.
Seller Date
Seller Date
III
AGENTS INSPECTION DISCLOSURE
(To be completed only if the Seller is represented by an agent in
this transaction.)
THE UNDERSIGNED, BASED ON THE ABOVE INQUIRY
OF THE SELLER(S) AS TO THE CONDITION OF THE
PROPERTY AND BASED ON A REASONABLY COMPE-
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TENT AND DILIGENT VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE AC-
CESSIBLE AREAS OF THE PROPERTY IN CONJUNCTION
WITH THAT INQUIRY, STATES THE FOLLOWING:
Agent (Broker
Representing Seller) By
(Please Print) (Associate Licensee
or Broker-Signature)
Date
IV
AGENTS INSPECTION DISCLOSURE
(To be completed only if the agent Who has obtained the offer is
other than the agent above.)
THE UNDERSIGNED, BASED ON A REASONABLY COM-
PETENT AND DILIGENT VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE
ACCESSIBLE AREAS OF THE PROPERTY, STATES THE
FOLLOWING:
Agent (Broker
Representing Seller) By
(Please Print) (Associate Licensee
or Broker-Signature)
Date
V
BUYER(S) and SELLER(S) MAY WISH TO OBTAIN PRO-
FESSIONAL ADVICE AND/OR INSPECTIONS OF THE
PROPERTY AND TO PROVIDE FOR APPROPRIATE PROVI-
SIONS IN A CONTRACT BETWEEN BUYER AND
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SELLER(S) WITH RESPECT TO ANY ADVICE/INSPEC-
TIONS/DEFECTS.
I/WE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF A COPY OF THIS
STATEMENT.
Seller Date- Buyer Date__
Seller Date- Buyer Date__
Agent (Broker
Representing Seller) By
(Please Print) (Associate Licensee
or Broker-Signature)
Date
Agent (Broker
Obtaining the Offer) By
(Please Print) (Associate Licensee
or Broker-Signature)
Date
A REAL ESTATE BROKER IS QUALIFIED TO ADVISE ON
REAL ESTATE. IF YOU DESIRE LEGAL ADVICE, CON-
SULT YOUR ATTORNEY.

